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CHAPTERl 
INTRODUCTION 
I examine the interrelationships among the multiple dimensions of chief executive 
officer or "CEO" power proposed by Finkelstein (1992), and include the indirect effects 
that governance conditions have on these power dimensions and organizational 
outcomes. This chapter will provide a brief introduction as well a research question. A 
brief theoretical background . will be then presented, followed by the dissertation 
objectives. Finally, theoretical and practical implications will be addressed. 
The Research Question 
Much organizational research has focused on the CEO (Cannella & Shen, 2001). 
The majority of CEO research has been conducted in areas such as CEO compensation 
(Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000) or strategic choice (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996). Explicit or implicit in these studies is the concept th.at CEOs are 
powerful and influential individuals within an organization who can have direct effects 
on organizational choices (Daily & Johnson, 1997). In fact, most scholars agree that the 
CEO is the most powerful member of an organization (see Barkema & Pennings, 1998; 
Bigley & Wiersema, 2002; Daily & Johnson, 1997; Ocasio, 1994; Pearce & Robinson, 
1987). Therefore, I assume that CEO power is an underlying influence in the 
organization. 
Power 1s defined as the "capacity of individual actors to exert their will" 
(Finkelstein, 1992). Power can be classified as formal or informal (Finkelstein & 
D'Aveni, 1994), as well as relative, such as CEO-board relative power (Finkelstein & 
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Boyd~ 1998; Pearce & Zahra, 1991). Formal power relates to factors that directly provide 
the CEO with decision-making influences, such as equity holdings (Barkema & 
Pennings, 1998), CEO du~lity (Cannella & Shen, 2001), .or other formal organizational 
titles (Daily & Johnson, 1997). Informal power relates to factors that do not directly 
depend on the CEO's formal positions (Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994). Factors such as 
external directorate .networks ( Geletkanycz; Boyd, & Finkelstein, 2001 ), tenure (Magnan, 
St-Onge, & Calloc'h, 1999), and experience in various functions within the organization 
(Finkelstein, 1992). have been operationalized as informal power. Relative power relates 
to factors that indirectly affect both the formal and informal power base of the CEO. 
Boards of directors (Farrell & Whidbee, 2002), active institutional investors (Wright, 
Kroll & Elenkov.; 2002), and other forces decrease the discretionary power of the CEO 
(Finkelstein & Boyd~ 1998). Explicit in relative power studies is the understanding that 
there are inherit agency costs associated with the power given to the CEO, and that 
relative power factors are necessary to minimize self-interest costs (see Davis, 1991; 
Gerety, Hoi, & Robin, 2001; Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993; Redicker& Seth, 1995). 
Although ,many studies have incorporated the various· types of CEO power 
(informal, formal, or relative) to determine their effects on topics such as CEO 
compensation, strategic choice, and firm performance, the results have been mixed. In an 
exhaustive analysii; of over 137 studies, Tosi, Werner, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia (2000) 
cite simplicity of CEO models and the lack of relevant antecedents and moderators as, 
major reasons for these mixed results. Inconsistency of proposed main effects, for 
example, could be attributed to important indirect (or moderated) effects (Gilley, Walters, 
& Olson, 2002). Furthermore, studies that incorporate these CEO dimensions of power 
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have done so inconsistently and normally in isolation. For example, Finkelstein and 
D'Aveni (1994) employ a global measure of informal powers, while Hitt, Bierman, 
Shimizu, and Kochhar (2001) employ individual· indicators of informal power to. explain 
organizational outcomes. Yet, no study has examined all dimensions of CEO power with 
both direct and indirect relationships. 
Finkelstein (1992) and later Daily and Johnson (1997) encourage top executive 
researchers to incorporate a multi-dimensional power model. CEO power is a complex 
construct that cannot be measured by a single variable. Finkelstein (1992), in a seminal 
piece, provides an exhaustive top executive power model · that is the basis for this 
dissertation. The proposed dimensions of power can be seen in Figure 1. 
Structural Power 
Number of titles 
Relative CEO 
compensation 
Ownership Power 
Executive shares 
Founder status 
Family shares 
Prestige Power 
Corporate boards 
Nonprofit boards 
Av.erage board 
rating 
Elite education 
Expert Power 
Critical expertise 
Functional areas 
Positions in finn 
Structural power is based on formal organizational structure 
and hierarchy authority. 
Ownership power is based on an executive's capacity as an 
agent acting on behalf of shareholders. 
Prestige power is based on an executive's reputation in the 
institutional environment and among stakeholders. 
Expert power is based on an executive's ability to deal with 
industry factors and contribute to the organization's.success. 
Figure 1: Finkelstein's (1992) Executive Power Dimensions 
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· As is shown in Figure 1, Finkelstein provides a more specific categorization of direct 
CEO powers than the informal and formal power classification schemes. Both structural 
and ownership power would fall under the formal power classification, while prestige and 
expert power would be classified as informal power. 
To develop an objective-based model, Finkelstein surveyed 1,763 top managers to 
assess the reliability and validity of his proposed four power dimensions. Finkelstein 
found that each indicator loaded independently on its respective power dimension. In 
addition, all four dimensions had high internal consistency and discriminant validity. As 
well, three. of the four dimensions (structural, ownership, and prestige) had predictive 
validity. 
The aforementioned model was initially promoted as a top management team 
"TMT" model. There is no doubt that TMTs have profound effects on organizations. 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) proposed that a variety of observable and psychological 
TMT characteristics influence both strategic choice and organizational performance. 
Specifically, age, organizational tenure, education, and functional experience have been 
shown to be particularly important {Bantel & Jackson, 1989). An important assumption 
of this dissertation-that the CEO is the most powerful member of a TMT-does not 
downplay the significance of the upper echelon model proposed by Hambrick and Mason 
(1984). The,CEO is different from other top executives (Daily & Johnson, 1997). The 
CEO has a unique advantage over other top executives to influence the organization due 
: to the authority inherent in his/her position (Roth, 1995; Bigley & Wiersema, 2002). 
Daily and Johnson (1997) modified-Finkelstein's model to represent CEO power. 
The basic model was intact, but Daily and Johnson included board independence ( outside 
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board members not appointed by the current CEO) and CEO duality in the classification 
of structural power, while they eliminated number of titles. They also eliminated critical 
expertise and positions in the firm in the expert power category, and average board rating 
in the ownership power dimension. Daily and Johnson, using a longitudinal design, 
extended the model by examining the direct relationship these power dimensions have on 
firm performance. Their model is shown in Figure 2. 
Interdependent 
directors 
Relative 
compens,ition 
Duality 
CEO stock 
ownership 
Founder 
CEO education 
Nonprofit boards 
Number of for-
profit boards 
CEO functions 
Jensen's 
alpha 
Adjusted 
ROE 
Adiusted ROI 
Figure 2: Daily and Johnson (1997) Executive Power Model 
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However, by using the structural equation method or "SEM", the measurement model. 
had no acceptable solution. Therefore, Daily and Johnson had to test each item 
separately to determine · the individual effects on performance measures. The resuJts 
showed that the·overall fit of CEO power indicators was generally acceptable, while CEO 
duality,· CEO .stock ownership, and number of nonprofit boards on which the CEO served 
were nonsignificant. Daily and Johnson's model, however, is a simple direct-effects 
model, whereas Finkelstein (1992) encouraged further extension of his power model to 
include examination of the interactions and effects on organizational outcomes. 
I utilize the basic model of Finkelstein (1992) with a CEO power and agency cost 
emphasis, and propose an extension of the model that examines both direct and indirect 
effects on certain organizational outcomes, as well as interrelationships among the power 
dimensions. Therefore, the basic research question of the present study is: Are there 
relationships among the CEO power dimensions and governance conditions, and do 
these relationships affect strategic choice,.such as diversification and research and 
development investments? 
Dissertation Objectives 
The objectives of this dissertation are: 
1. To determine the explanatory power of informal CEO power dimensions on structural 
power. 
2. To determine the explanatory power of the interactions of informal CEO power 
dimensions· on structural power. 
3. To deterniine the moderating effects of governance mechanisms and stock ownership 
on.the relationship between informal CEO power dimensions and structural power. 
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4. . To detennine the explanatory power of structural power on certain organizational 
· outcomes, specifically strategic choice ( diversification and research and development 
investment). 
5. To determine the moderating effects of governance mechanisms on the relationship 
between structural power and strategic choice. 
6. To determine the mediating effects of structural power on the relationship between 
informal powers and strategic choice. 
··Substantive Contributions 
By examining. an extended CEO power model, this dissertation will provide a 
stronger base for research on CEO. topics such · as strategic choice, compensation or 
succession. Further, this dissertation will provide relevant insights for practitioners to 
increase understanding of CEO powers, along with the mechanisms necessary to keep 
these powers in balance. 
To CEO Research Literature: There is no doubt that TMT research has provided 
important findings that show its importance on organizational outcomes (Bantel & 
Jackson, .1989; Weinzimmer, 1997), but as part of the TMT, the CEO is the highest-
ranking executive within the organization and, as. such, has the most influence and formal 
authority (Bigley & Wiersema, 2002; Ocasio, 1994). Thus, this dissertation takes a more 
fine-grained approach by looking at the single most powerful actor within the TMT and 
the organization; It is incumbent upon management scholars who· study CEO topics to 
understand the underpinnings of CEO power (Finkelstein, 1992), as well as to incorporate 
more sophisticated models in order to accurately predict and explain the influences and 
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motivations of CE Os (Daily & Johnson; 1997; Finkelstein, 1992). Most CEO studies are 
cross-sectional and include simplistic direct effect designs {Tosi et al., 2000). The 
extended model will contribute to a better understanding of CEO topics. 
To the Management Practice: . Topics such as CEO compensation are receiving more 
scrutiny within the business community. For example, the ten highest paid CEOs in 
Ameri~a had an average compensation package of over $170 million (Business Week, 
2002) yet, there appears · to be a disconnect between CEO compensation and firm 
performance {Tosi et al., 2000} Thus, by examining the interrelationship of multi-
dimensional CEO power and its effects -on strategic choice, the findings could not only 
lead us to understand the· underpinnings of CEO power but also gain a more enlightened 
perspective of CEO topics such as· compensation. This increased knowledge may help 
address questions such· as why some CEOs also become the board chairperson and/or 
company president; how the CEO influences the board of directors to increase executive 
compensation despite poor firm performance; or how CEOs withstand shareholder-
friendly takeovers. 
Outline of Dissertation 
The first chapter is devoted to the introduction, which includes the rationale for 
and the objectives of this study. In the second chapter, a review of the relevant literature 
and theoretical foundations will be presented. Further, a conceptual model central to this 
dissertation will be presented, which will include the power dimensions of the CEO as 
well as moderators such as governance mechanisms. Research hypotheses and 
methodology will follow in Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to review literature that is relevant to the proposed 
·· research question. · First, there will be an overview of the important theoretical and 
empirical developments significant to the proposed study. Next, this chapter will discuss 
the rationale for the utilization of the various constructs in the dissertation's design. 
Finally, a conceptual modelwill be presented. 
Power Perspective 
Power is the ability to influence others in order to get one's will (Rahiin, 1989). 
In fact, Pettigrew (1973: 240) states, "an accurate perception of the power distribution in 
the social arena in which he lives ... is a necessary prerequisite for the man seeking 
powerful support for his demands." Therefore, understanding the uses and assessment of 
power within organizations is essential for addressing many organizational/management 
topics, including CEO research (Pfeffer, 1992). 
The examination of executive power in organizational research is not new. Child 
(1972) argued that power is essential for top executives to be dominant in pursuing their 
preferences in strategic choice. There are many CEO and upper echelon studies showing 
that top executives can influence both strategic choice and firm performance (Child, 
1972; Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Daily & Johnson, 1997; Finkelstein, 1992, Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984; Ruefli, Collins, & Lacugna, 1999). Daily and Johnson (1997) argue that 
since the CEO is the most powerful actor within the firm, an emphasis on CEO research 
is warranted. In fact, CEO studies in strategic management are plentiful, and include 
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such topics as CEO duality (Boyd, 1995; Fosberg, 1999), CEO succession (Boeker, 1992; 
Vancil, 1987), and CEO compensation (Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 1989), among 
others. Yet, many CEO studies are simplistic in both measurement and design (Tosi, 
Werner, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000). Some measures of CEO power, for example, 
include CEO/board structure dependence (Mallette & Fowler, 1992), CEO ownership 
(Barkema & Pennings, 1998), and CEO informal powers (Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994; 
Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, & Kochhar, 2001). However, these measures of CEO power are 
used without regard to the complexity and potential interactions among them. 
Most researchers of executive power would concur that the power construct is too 
complex to be encompassed by a measure with a single dimension (Astely & Sachdeva, 
1984; Geletkanycz, Boyd, & Finkelstein, 2001; Krackhardt,· 1990). French and Raven 
(1959) provide a model of leadership power that is well used in organizational behavior 
research. This model multi-dimensional contains five sources of power. . Legitimate 
power represents the formal authority, or, in other words the individual's position within 
the organization. Reward power relates to the utilization·ofpositive rewards to influence 
. others, while coercive power represents the use of negative punishments. Expert power 
relates to influences one.can gain due to knowledge, expertise, or skills. Finally, referent 
power refers to influence generated because of one's desirable resources or personal 
characteristics. This model has provided interesting results. For example, both expert 
and referent powers were positively associated with employee satisfaction while 
legitimate power was positively. associated with employee compliance and negatively 
related to satisfaction (Rahi:r:n, 1989). However, this early typology suffers from poor 
content and convergent validity (Rahim, 1986). The reason is that it incorporates the 
10 
· perception of the subordinates to determine the amount of power possessed by their 
leader. Researchers using these perceptual measures assume that "social actors are 
knowledgeable about power within their organizations; informants are willing to divulge 
what they know about the power distributions; and such a questioning process will not 
itself create the phenomenon under study, namely, power" (Pfeffer, 1981:55). Perceptual 
measures used in various power models have been highly criticized as to the 
questionability of validity (Finkelstein, 1992). 
Due to these oft-repeated criticisms, Finkelstein (1992) constructed and tested a 
multi-dimensional power model. In his design, Finkelstein conducted three studies to 
validate his model. In the initial study, Finkelstein constructed four dimensions of 
executive power using responses from top executives and inside board members. Both 
reliability and discriminant validity were established in these scales. Finklestein's four 
dimensions of power are expert power, which is defined as the ability to effectively 
manage the firm; prestige power, which is derived from the executive's level of status or 
prestige; structural power, which is derived from the formal authority given by the titles 
held by the executive, often referred as ~'hierarchical" power (Daily & Johnson, 1997); 
and finally, ownership power, which is obtained by those executives who maintain 
ownership ties to the firm. 
Finkelstein's second study surveyed top managers to rate the dimensions of power 
in their own firms; using this data (perceived power) in conjunction with demographic 
data established convergent validity. Expert power, however, had some problems with 
convergent validity, since the indicators failed to have significant correlations with 
perceived power. Lastly, Finkelstein strengthened the validity and overall development 
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of the power dimensions by examining predictive validity. This study found that three of 
the four dimensions had predictive validity relating to organizational outcomes. 
Daily and Johnson (1997) utilized Finkelstein's power dimensions to examine the 
effects of CEO power on firm performance. Although Daily and Johnson used the basic 
framework of the dimension~ of power, they modified some of the dimensions. For 
example, expert power was modified to designate functional experience as the sole 
indicator of expert power. Another difference between the two designs was the testing 
methods utilized. Finkelstein. factor analyzed indicators for each power dimension and 
then created a global measure .for each of the four dimensions of power. To test these 
measures, he used multiple regression to determine relationships between these power 
dimensions and firm acquisitions. Daily and Johnson's design incorporated confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) and structural equation model (SEM) to establish relationships 
between power dimensions and firm performance. A setback in their study was that the 
CF A had no acceptable solution (i.e., no dimension reached the minimum level of overall 
. fit or reliability); thus, the analysis incorporated the testing of specific indicators (i.e., 
CEO education) rather than the testing of latent variables (i.e., prestige power, which 
includes the indicators of CEO education, nonprofit board membership, and for-profit 
board membership). Therefore, instead of incorporating the four latent variables (the four 
dimensions of power) based on the CF A, the analysis included strictly SEM, which is 
analogous to a path analysis. 
The SEM analysis tested the effects of each indicator on firm performance. CEO 
duality, stock ownership and number of nonprofit boards were never significant, while 
founder status, number of for-profit hoards and CEO elite education were found to have a 
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significant relationship with firm performance. Even though the results were not 
definitive for some indicators, this study suggested that CEO power indicators affect firm 
performance.·· 
, In addition to this framework, other scholars have differentiated the direct sources 
of power into two categories-formal and infonnal power. As mentioned in chapter one, 
formal power is the direct authority that provides the CEO with decision-making 
opportunities (i.e., CEO duality, ownership, and number of significant titles); informal 
power relates to factors that do not directly depend on the CEO's formal positions (i.e., 
tenure and education); and relative power (an indirect source of power) relates to factors 
that will affect both the formal and informal power base of the CEO. I argue that the 
formal/informal power framework is analogous to Finkelstein's four classifications of 
power, with structural and ownership power tapping into the formal power construct, and 
expert and prestige power channeling into the construct of informal power. Thus, in 
order to provide a more fine-grained design of CEO power, Finkelstein's four 
classificati.ons of power will be used to operationalize formal and informal power. 
Further, board governance, the most popular relative power measure used in CEO studies 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) will be incorporated to address CEO relative power. 
The analysis of CEO power has exclusively examined structural, ownership, 
prestige, and expert powers as exogenous variables without examining the potential 
interrelationships among them. For example, there are numerous studies that have 
examined CEO duality or ownership, which are types of formal power, and their effects 
on various firm outcomes (see Allan & Widman, 2000; Daily & Dalton, 1994; Westphal, 
1998 for CEO duality, and see Hill & Snell, 1988; Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin, 
13 
1988; Anderson, Bates, Bizjak, & Lemmon, 2000 for ownership). Yet, most designs treat 
these dimensions as "same-level" variables, which may not be appropriate due to the 
complexity of the power dimensions. Thus, I incorporate in the CEO model the inherent 
complex nature of CEO power by examining the interactions among the various. types of 
power, as well as the effects of power on a firm's strategic choices. 
Human Capital 'I'heory 
Becker (1993), a winning Nobel Prize economic scholar, defines human capital as 
the abilities and experiences of individuals.that are of value to the organization. In the 
context of this dissertation, human capital theory is relevant since its theoretical 
framework suggests that as an individual's human capital increases so does. his or her 
power. Accordingly, these human capital 'attributes increase information asymmetry and 
tacit knowledge, which in turn increases the motivation to retain human capital since it 
becomes internally valuable to the organization (Lepak & Snell, 2002) and can produce a 
competitive advantage (Hitt et al., 2001}. Thus, it is to the organization's benefit to 
invest in thisintangible resource (Becker, 1993). 
Human capital is a socioeconomic,..based theory that examines a broad spectrum 
of factors that contribute to the quality of the work force and enhance the wealth of 
individuals (Becker, 1993). Education, training, and family are considered important 
factors of human capital (Becker, 1993; Becker & Murphy; 1988; Freeman, 1976). 
Education is increasingly seen as a contributor to both personal wealth and quality of the 
work force. For example, Murphy and Welch (1989), in an extensive study, found that 
salaries of recent university graduates increased sharply to the highest level in fifty years, 
even after controlling for inflation. Thus, education has been deemed as more important 
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in recent years, likely due to the increased complexity of tasks in the workplace (Becker, 
1993). Besides formal education, on-the-job training is a key factor contributing to the 
value of human capital. Economists such as Mincer and Higuchi (1988) provide 
estimates on the value of on-site training and suggest that this form of "education" is just 
as valuable as formal education. Finally, the family structure and environment have been 
shown to be influential on .human capital. For example, abuse as children, low-income 
families, and large families have all negatively affected human capital (i.e., these 
generally have negative effects on children's knowledge, skills, and formed habits) 
(Becker, 1993). 
Management scholars stress the importance of the human element · when 
examining strategic management topics such as strategic choice and firm performance 
(Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, & Kochhar, 2001) and CEO topics (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1996). Thus, human capital theory is applicable for this dissertation since the concept 
and definition of human capital is similar to Finkelstein's (1992) expert and prestige 
. power dimensions. 
Expert power relates to the· abilities of the CEO necessary for the success in the 
firm. Finkelstein's indicators of expert power .include executive functions, critical 
expertise (i.e., experience in inputs, outputs, throughputs, and regulation of organizational 
functions, and regulatory concerns) and number of positions held. However, although 
these measures had internal consistency and discriminant validity, such indicators did not 
have convergent and predictive validity. 
Indicators of expert power not included in Finkelstein's original model but used 
extensively in human capital theory designs are level of education and tenure (See 
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Becker, 1993; Harris & Helfat, 1997; Hitt et al.; 2001; Lepak & Snell, 2002; Tharenou, 
2001). However, in a later study, Finkelstein incorporated both tenure and education as 
important indicators of informal power (Finkelstein & D 'Aveni, 1994). Numerous 
studies have shown a strong correlation between level of education and an individual's 
abilities (Becker, 1993 ). Abilities have been operationalized as an individual's 
intelligence or aptitude scores, and Becker argues that education contributes to these 
abilities and that these abilities provide value to organization. There are also studies 
indicating that lev~l of education is perceived by middle-level managers as an important 
indicator of CEO abilities and competencies {Miller & Wiseman, 2001 ): This perception 
is particularly salient for those managers with greater work experience. Tenure also has 
been widely used in CEO studies, and has been associated with strategic management 
topics such as CEO·succession (Cannella & Shen, 2001),.compensation (Sanders, Davis-
Blake, & Fredrickson, 1995), and firm performance (Sigler & Porterfield, 2001). 
Indicators of prestige power included in Finkelstein's dimension (service on 
corporate boards, nonprofit boards, and elite education) are common factors used in 
operationalizing human capital. In their work on human capital's effect on firm 
performance, Hitt et al. {2001) found that elite education had positive direct effects on 
firm performance and indirect effects on strategy and firm performance. Elite education 
as well, as prestigious board appointments provide individuals with valuable knowledge 
gained through their interaction With elite individuals (D' Aveni & Kesner, 1993;, 
Mizruchi & Steams, 1989). Therefore, human capital theory provides additional 
validation of Finklestein's model, and thus bolsters the theoretical basis for examining 
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-the relationship among the various dimensions of power and their effects on strategic 
choice and firm performance. 
Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence theory may be of value as well in explaining why an 
individual strives to attain more power. Organization theorists maintain that 
organizations must depend upon their environment in order to grow and survive within 
the industry. Resources, however, may become limited due to competition, complexity, 
dynamism, and other industry factors. This scarcity of resources can create 
organizational uncertainty. For firms to compete, they must acquire critical resources to 
minimize the uncertainties present in the external environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). Thus, organizations strive to minimize the impact of environmental factors by 
decreasing their dependence on other firms for access to these scarce resources. 
A central tenet of resource dependence theory is the desire to reduce uncertainty. 
Many strategies could be incorporated to reduce this uncertainty within the industry. 
Strategic alliances are agreements among various firms that commtt to a specific 
arrangement in order to share resources to develop business opportunities (Das & Teng, 
1998). These alliances, in general, have two forms: equity and non-equity (Kogut, 1988). 
Joint venture, an equity form of alliance, is defined as the combination of two or more 
companies that form a separate legal entity. Joint ventures are mainstream strategies that 
offer advantages of efficiencies to obtain competitive advantages that may not otherwise 
be achieved (Hennart, 1988). Moreover, there is strong support that joint ventures are 
viable strategies to gain competitive advantage (Das & Teng, 1998). Networks, a non-
equity form of alliances, are recently becoming popular due to the flexibility of their 
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structures. Networks are a collection of organizations that work toward common aims, 
but do not form legal unions as do the traditional joint ventures. Both networks and joint 
ventures are used specifically to deal with environmental uncertainty .. Organizations may 
not readily have access to all the necessary resources to survive; thus, these alliances 
provide the basis for this access. 
Besides alliances, outside board members are seen as a necessary conduit of 
external information for the organization to reduce environmental uncertainties (Burt, 
. J 980). There is extensive research that supports this perspective. Firms select these 
external sources for important abilities that may not be available within the firm. In fact, 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) provide some imp.ortant roles that outside board members 
contribute to firm. One role, strategy, is the resource-dependence role of board members, · 
which enables these directors to act as a link between the organization and. the 
environment. Another role, service, provides counseling that is not necessarily available 
from within the organization (Dalton, D,aily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). Therefore, the 
· traditional perspective of resource dependence is to reduce uncertainty in the firm by 
allowing outside actors to provide the knowledge and connections necessary to compete 
in the industry. 
Another perspective, not yet developed within the realms of resource dependence 
theory, addresses the desire and potential for reducing uncertainty from the viewpoint of 
the CEO. The CEO is deemed the most important and dominant actor within the 
organization (Ocasio, 1994) due to his .or her position as the top executive with the 
greatest responsibility. However, the CEO can experience personal uncertainty because 
of threats to his or her power base or decision-making ability by other top executives or 
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board members. Therefore, the CEO could reduce personal uncertainty by centralizing 
the few top positions, such as the board chairperson and president. By consolidating 
these positions, the CEO has become the "keeper" of additional. resources and has 
decreased· uncertainty within the internal environment since he or she will have fewer 
power struggles with senior executives.. Moreover, the CEO with. the added titles and 
responsibilities is apt t0 influence other executives with rewards and/or threats with these 
resources, since individuals that can provide the "most critical and difficult" resources are 
deemed to have t~e most power and influence within the organization (Pfeffer, 1981). In 
addition to gaining access to more tangible resources, a CEO with consolidated power is 
able to increase his or her personal resource of knowledge, further setting him/herself 
apart from other executives relating to the knowledge of the firm. For example, as the 
CEO, knowledge would be gained. from gathering information as top executive about the 
daily operations of the firm, and as the chair, additional information could be gleaned 
from discussions during board meetings and one-on'-one discussions with board 
members. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) argue that those in higher positions have 
greater influence · over the organization, ··· since these executives have the overall 
responsibility and direct authority over the critical resources of the firm. More recently, 
Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) argued that the top executive with these additional titles of 
higher authority would have greater influence since he or she would have much more 
discretion over critical knowledge and resources than a CEO without these added titles. 
Agency Theory 
From an agency perspective, power given to or obtained by executives would be 
problematic if proper incentives are not established or if power is not monitored to ensure 
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that it is used in the best interest of shareholders. There is much controversy as to the 
existence and magnitude of the conflict of interest between management and shareholders 
(see Amihud & Lev, 1999, and Lane, Cannella & Lubatkin, 1998, for contrast~ng 
arguments). The agency theory perspective argues that principals, who do not have the 
time to personally manage and yet have an interest in a firm, will engage agents to 
manage the firms (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). With this arrangement, there is a 
separation of ownership and control, and thus a potential for agents to engage in self-
interest behaviors that may have negative outcomes for shareholders. For example, 
reducing employment risk could be the underlying motive ofan executive. Because of 
the perceived employment risk (loss of job), executives (or. agents) may have a tendency 
to make self-serving decisions, choices that could likely restrain growth and change. To 
reduce employment risk, top executives introduce strategies that could be unattractive to 
their corporations. Thus, the proponents of agency theory maintain that with this 
conflicting self-interest, executives in management-controlled firms will have different 
strategy motives than executives in owner-controlled firms (Amihud & Lev, 1981). 
· Therefore, it is incumbent on shareholders not employed with. the firm to ensure that a 
governing body will minimize the self..cinterests of top executives (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996). The more power distributed to the governing body, the greater the 
capacity it will have to minimize these agency costs. 
One governing body is the shareholders. Redicker and Seth (1995) examined 
U.S. bank-holding companies to find that firms with larger contingents of outside 
shareholders required less monitoring than firms with fewer major shareholders, where 
the monitoring capacity was operationalized as the percentage of outside board members. 
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These majority shareholders can take an active role in leading firms to become a 
powerful governing force (Holderness & Sheehan, 1988). Hoskisson, Johnson, and 
.. Moesel (1994) found that when there were large block stockholders (i.e., major 
shareholders), the corporation was less likely to engage in diversification strategies. Hill 
.and Snell (1989) found that when stockholders dominated the corporation, business 
strategies generally focused on building financial benefits to firm, such as investments in 
R&D; however, in corporations dominated by top management, strategies typically 
centered on issues of job security,such as unrelated diversification. 
Besides major shareholders, the board of directors is the governing body that has 
received the. most attention in relation to minimizing agency costs (Daily & Schwenk, 
1996) and is deemed the center of corporate governance (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). · 
Independent boards are regarded as most appropriate when there are concerns about 
agency costs (Pearce & Zahra, 1992). Board independence is defined as the extent to 
which boards can effectively monitor management (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). 
Thus, independent boards have been operationalized as the number of outside members 
of the board divided by total board members, with a higher ratio equating to greater 
independence (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992). Recently, some have defined an independent 
board member as an outside board member who is appointed before the CEO took office, 
since CEOs are influential on the selection of board members (Lorsch, 1989). Yet, the 
majority of research examining independent board effects on minimizing agency costs 
has used the percentage of all outside board members as the independent board measure 
(Daily, McDougall, Covin, & Dalton, 2002). 
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The effects of independent boards on firm p.erformance are mixed (Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). However, researchers have had much more success in 
finding board effects on other firm outcomes. Newman and Mozes (1999) found that 
board independence was positively related to CEO dismissals ·when firms were 
performing poorly, while Zantout and O'Reilly-Allen (1996) found a negative 
relationship between the . percentage of outside board members and unrelated 
diversification. Hoskisson, Johnson, and Moesel (1994) found that as .outside board 
equity increased, the number .· of divestitures decreased. Thus, an agency theory 
perspective is complimentary to the power theory framework, in that agency theorists 
would argue that providing a i,trong governing body to balance CEO power is an 
important tool in minimizing agency costs by giving top executives relative rather than 
ultimate power. 
Conceptual Model 
Thus far in Chapter 2, relevant theories have been discussed in order to provide a 
background for the proposed conceptual model. A power perspective is the underlying 
theoretical framework for. this dissertation. An important proposition of this manuscript 
is that the four dimensions of power-expert, prestige, structural, and ownership--have a 
complex interrelationship. I propose that prestige and expert (informal powers) will 
provide the CEO with more structural power. Further, if the CEO also has ownership 
power, then this top executive will° attain even.more structural power. 
Alongside the power· perspective, human capital theory provides compelling 
evidence that with strong informal powers, such as expert and prestige power, individuals 
attain more structural power. Resource dependence theory adds support that increasing 
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structural power provides CEOs with greater influence over other.executives of the firm .. 
Thus, with this power, the CEO has strong control over strategic decisions. 
Besides the power constructs, I incorporate board vigilance, which is a safeguard 
against abuse of power by dominant CEOs. Agency theorists would argue. that· board 
vigilance would not only monitor· the CEO to ensure that strategic choices are aligned 
with shareholders interests, but would also strive to limit the amount of power the CEO 
could attain. See Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Dissertation CEO Power Model 
To conclude, the Finkelstein (1992) model provides a comprehensive framework that can 
be used to examine the dimensions of power to determine their inte1Telationships and 
their effects on organizational outcomes. Finkelstein suggests that these dimensions of 
power are associated with strategic choices such as acquisitions and diversification. 
Daily and Johnson (1997) borrowed and adapted this multi-dimensional model to test its 
effect on firm performance. The results were encouraging, with many items within the 
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· dimensions of power providing explanatory power to · the direct effects · on firm 
performance. However, both Finkelstein and Daily and Johnson, in the afore-mentioned 
studies, treat these dimensions as "same level'' variables. . Yet, there are likely complex 
relationships · among the dimensions. A major contribution of this dissertation is the 
examination of these complex relationships, which will reveal that certain dimensions of 
power will beget other dimensions of power. 
Utilizing these distinctions of CEO power, I propose that informal power, such as 
CEO tenure (expert power) or elite education (prestige power), may lead to a CEO 
holding additional titles of chairperson of the board, president of the firm, and/or other 
important titles in the firm (i.e., structural power). Thus, certain types of power may lead 
to other types of power.· Pfeffer (1983) argues that individuals with informal power will 
gain personal mystique and loyalty, and with this loyalty should come more. formal 
power. Leonard (1990) suggests that informal power works indirectly to affect outcomes 
such as compensation through increased hierarchal positions, while Brass and Burkhardt 
(1993) fo.und that structural power (i.e., promotion to supervisor) arises from people's 
actions and abilities. Yet, such proposed relationships have not been tested from a CEO 
power perspective. 
Finally, ownership power is another dimension of power that may directly affect 
the CEO's ability to obtain more structural power. From a model building perspective, 
this dissertation's focus is to isolate the direct effects of expert and prestige power and 
then predict the factors, such as ownership power, that could strengthen or weaken the 
· effects of these informal powers on:structural power. 
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CHAPTER3 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
The previous chapter dealt with the review of important theoretical frameworks 
that provide a basis for arguments to establish the proposed model that Was presented in 
Chapter 2. This chapter is devoted to the hypotheses development and the methodology. 
I utilize two well-respected theories to provide support that once a CEO has 
established strong expert and prestige power, more structural power will follow. 
Human Capital Theory 
The central tenet' of human capital theory is that the skills, knowledge and 
experiences that an individual brings to the firm are individual-specific, and these 
individual qualities become valuable to the organization (Hitt et al., 2001). Becker 
(1993) states that there is exhaustive evidence that the more the investment in human 
capital, the more the productivity and earning power of the individual. This human 
element has grown in importance, because obtaining and retaining knowledge in a rapidly 
changing environment is essential for the success of an organization .. Thus, intangible 
human capital (such as education and work experience) is particularly important to be 
able to compete in complex environments (Hitt et. al., 2001), and is a vital resource for 
strategic management (Lee & Miller, 1999). 
As the CEO accumulates · these important qualities, abilities, and experiences 
relevant to organizational success (i.e., increases informal power), he or. she will likely be 
entrusted with other positions of authority and/or autonomy (Finkelstein, 1992). Such 
rationale is supported by management scholars such as Pfeffer (1978) who argue that 
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· structural power is centered around informal power. Thus, individuals with a high 
concentration of structural power would have greater informal power than individuals 
with less structural power. Harrison, Torres, and Kukalis (1988) concur, and they argue 
further that titles such as CEO/chairperson of the board are likely a reflection of 
concentrated informal power, such as experiences gained from tenure or education. In 
other words, executives who have been given structural power, and thus greater authority 
over firm decisions, have demonstrated previously through their knowledge and abilities 
(i.e., high informal powers) that they were competent enough to be given more structural 
power. 
As mentioned previously, human capital has been operationalized in many ways 
(Berkowitz, 2001). The use of variables such as tenure, level of education, and prestige 
of the educational institution the individual attended have been found to be useful in 
research designs (see Hitt et al., 2001; Miller & Wiseman, 2001; Tharenou, 2001; 
Carpenter & Wade, 2002). Thus, the expert and prestige power dimensions developed by 
.Finkelstein (1992) fall within the domain of human capital. These variables have 
provided much explanatory power on various outcomes. Prior research shows that 
ability, as previously defined as intelligence and aptitude, is correlated with indicators of 
human capital such as level of education (a form of expert power), and that higher levels 
of education will assist individuals in more complex situations (Becker, 1993). Wally 
and Baum (1994), in a survey of 106 CEOs, found a positive relationship between formal 
.education and cognitive ability, an important determinant in decision-making. In 
addition, formal education has .been linked to innovation· (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; 
Thomas, Litschert, & Ramaswamy, 1991). 
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Hurley, Fagenson--Eland, and-Sonnenfeld (1997) examined career advancement in 
a large multinational organization. They found that human capital (specifically, breadth 
of experiences and organizational tenure) was found to be associated with top 
management advancements. Tharenou (2001) found that the greatest returns on human 
capital were due to the increased work tenure for middle management and increased 
education for upper management promotions. - In a recent -study, Miller and Wiseman 
(2001) found that promotion history (rapid promotion to .significant positions) and 
functional experience were statistically significant and equally weighted in importance in 
young managers' perceptions of the abilities arid competencies of their CEO. Thus, 
many indicators of expert power are associated with the abilities and advancements of 
individuals. 
In addition, service on outside boards (a form of prestige power) may lead to 
important experiences and knowledge not gained from education or functional 
experiences. · The CEO obtains access to important external information (Pennings, 
1980), gains contact with other influential and important business elite (Useem, 1979), 
. and accrues greater status within the organization due to the -prestige attributed to 
directorship appointments. Zajac arid Westphal (1996) argue that the collective influence 
the upper echelon holds· from these interlocking directorships are comparable and may 
even outweigh the influence gained from experiences within the focal firm with regard to 
corporate strategy. 
The influence the CEO gains from external and influential contacts cart aid in 
establishing the legitimacy of the organization (Daily & Johnson, 1997), while such 
legitimacy given to the firm may likely assist the CEO in obtaining other responsibilities 
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and/or autonomy within the firm. Legitimacy can be defined as the extent to. which an 
organization "convinces its exchange partners" that it has a right to continue business 
with these various stakeholders (i.e., creditors, suppliers, buyers etc.) (Maurer, 1971 p. 
361). D'Aveni (1989) examined bankrupt firms with "matched" survivor firms to find 
bankrupt firms were preceded by the exit of executives that held prestigious external 
directorship appointments. The implication is that these executives were able to provide 
some legitimacy to the firm and consequently may have helped firms avoid bankruptcy. 
Although there is no empirical study that examines the relationship between membership 
on prestigious outside boards and promotion of executives, there does appear to be solid 
logic that CEOs and other executives who have had tenure in these positions of prestige 
would likely have received greater opportunities. for structural authority (i.e., promotion 
or obtaining more titles) than those who have had fewer or less prominent board 
appointments. 
Elite education, another form of prestige power, can also be seen as a catalyst of 
accruing further structural power. Miller and Wiseman (2001) found that the university 
or univers_ities attended by CEO was an important indicator of perceived CEO power 
from the perspective of middle management. This relationship became stronger when the 
analysis included tenure of middle management. In other words, the more seasoned these 
managers became, the more emphasis they placed on the importance of elite education on 
the CEO's perceived power. One study found that lawyers who graduated from 
prestigious law schools were able to obtain loyal clients and ultimately affect the law 
firm's performance (Hitt et al., 2001). In academic settings, there is a strong relationship 
between Ph.D. students of tier one schools being hired by top universities (Debackere & 
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Rappa, 1995). It is assumed that if ·scholars come from elite school&, they will have 
superior skills (Hitt et al., 2001). Debackere and Rappa (1995) examined the promotion 
- of 3 73 scientists to find that prestige of their alma mater was found to be a significant 
indicator of the prestige of their academic appointment in the initial five years after 
graduation. Finally, D' Aveni (1989) found that having executives with elite education 
provided the legitimacy that helped contribute to the success of survivor firms,. while the 
lack of top management elite education status decreased the legitimacy of the firm. Thus, 
when executives have elite education, such prominence provides legitimacy to the firm. 
Firms then may provide incentives such as greater structural power to retain these 
executives. To date, there is no study that has tested the direct effects of elite education 
on CEO structural power. Yet, there is compelling evidence suggesting _that elite 
education will lead the executives to higher status positions and thus increased structural 
power. 
Both directorships and elite educations provide executives with prestige based on 
. their link with a particular educational institution or other organizations. Another form of 
prestige power that is an internal link to the firm is-founder status. Founders have strong 
organizational influence; particularly if the founder is the CEO of the firm (Daily & 
Johnson, 1997). The founder can become the focal point of the organization because of 
the nature of the position based on the prestige of being the originator of the firm 
(Nelson, 2003). This status of the founder may then lead him or her to play an influential 
defining role within the organization such as developing a mission statement, outlining 
objectives, and making other important firm decisions (Vesper; 1996; Gimeno, Folta, 
Cooper, & Woo, 1997). In tum, this influence may lead the individual to more structural 
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power. Yet, in the .domain of strategic management.research, very little empirical work 
has been performed on the influences of founders on the organization (Nelson, 2003). 
More specific to this dissertation; founder .based Tesearch in the context of CEO topics 
· such strategic choice are nonexistent; there are however, a few studies that deal with 
founder- status and firm performance (Daily, McDougall, Covin, & Dalton, 2002). 
Despite this, there are those who argue that if the CEO is also the founder, he or she will 
gain power due to the interaction with important stakeholders of the firm (Finkelstein, 
1992; Daily . & Johnson, 1997). A recent study of CEO successions observed that 
CEO/founders were less likely to have succession than CEO/non-founders (Ocasio, 
1999). Daily and Dalton (1994) observed that founder-led firms had CEOs who were 
also chairperson of the board more frequently than did nonfounder-led firms. Thus, 
founders may use their founder.status in retaining-structural power that·is already present. 
Thus, structural power may be particularly important since there is support that as the 
firm becomes_ larger and older, the founder has an increased chance of being force from 
the firm (Boeker &Karichalil, 2002). 
- In summary, both dimensions·ofinformal power-. expert and prestige power-are 
important sources of power that · contribute to advancements and promotions for 
individuals ~ithin organizations. These sources of power also provide legitimacy to the 
abilities of individuals, thus leading to higher status positions. Although no study has 
specifically examined the effects of expert and prestige power on a· CEO's structural, 
power, there is support that these informal powers ·increase structural power for others 
within the organization. I -propose that, although the position of the chief executive 
officer is the most important position in the firm, the holder of this position will be given 
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· added responsibilities, and thus more structural power, based on the CEO's expert and 
prestigious sources of power. 
Resource Dependence Theory 
Human capital theory was used to explain why CEOs gain more structural power 
(i.e., because of their abilities, experiences, and knowledge - expert and prestige power); 
resource dependence theory, when viewed in the context bf the CEO within the internal 
environment of the firm, could be incorporated as an important theoretical basis to 
explain why the CEO would desire more structural power. The central tenet of resource 
dependence theory is that firms attempt to reduce uncertainty in the environment 
(Thompson, 1967). This uncertainty is based on the need to acquire the necessary 
' . 
resources to survive. Normally, to reduce uncertainty, co-optation strategies are 
incorporated within the firm. The firm will enlist outside board members to provide 
access to resources that would otherwise be unavailable to the firm (Daily, McDougall, 
Covin, & Dalton, 2002). 
Resource dependence theory may have different ramifications, ~epending upon 
one's viewpoint. As mentioned previously, from an organizational standpoint, one way 
that a firm can reduce uncertainty is to have members on the board that have outside 
experience and connections. However, from a CEO power perspective, uncertainty may 
' 
be increased by outside directors, since outside directors may challenge the different 
interests and views of the CEO (Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988). These differing views may 
r 
be exacerbated due to asymmetric information, which is information inequality (Shane & 
Cable, 1997). This asymmetry can present a problem since individual A may make 
different subjective decisions than individual B due to differences in quality and or 
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quantity of information. There is recent support that CEOs will use their influence to 
decrease this potential problem. Nelson (2003) found that firms with a founder as the 
CEO were more likely to have a greater number of inside board members than firms with 
. non-founder CEOs. 
Relating resource dependence theory in the context of the internal environment of 
the CEO, the CEO will likely have a different perspective of the operation of the firm 
than an outside board chairperson. The CEO is "in the trenches" of the operations of the 
firm and has obtained both tacit knowledge and intuition about the operations, while an 
outside chairperson examines the firm's operations, on the surface, that are gleaned from 
areas such as pro forma financial statements or from questions asked during the corporate 
board meetings or informal discussions. Disagreements may arise from the difference of 
opinions caused by information asymmetry. Therefore, the CEO faces potential 
uncertainty, such as disagreements, from others who hold prominent positions (i.e., the 
board chairperson) due in part to the differing quantity or quality of information that each 
possesses. 
Although the corporation may require a certain number of outside directors, the 
CEO likely will have a desire to reduce some uncertainty by attaining more structural 
power (Nelson, 2003). For example, a CEO that becomes the chairperson has reduced 
the number of influential actors within the firm, and thus reduced uncertainty by 
minimizing challenges to his or her power. Besides gaining the title of chairperson, the 
CEO may strive to obtain other top executive titles to further bolster the CEO's structural 
power. With this consolidation of structural power, the CEO can acquire increased 
knowledge of the operations of the firm and likely more authority that would be inherent 
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when one increases th~ number of formal titles. The CEO can then .use this knowledge 
and/or authority to control others' access to important information that is available only 
to the chairperson, president or top executives (Daily & Johnson, 1997). 
There is theoretical support that the CEO would desire more structural power. 
Daily and Johnson (1997) argued that a CEO's most influential source of power is 
structural power. Nelson (2003) argues that a CEO/founder, who has vested interest in 
the firm, will strive to ensure that he/she holds a duality position within the firm. 
Finkelstein (1992) found that of the four dimensions of executive power, structural power 
. ( 
had, by far, the strongest correlation with the perception of executive power. Other 
researchers argue that high structural power will protect the CEO from outside influences 
(Pollock, Fischer, & Wade, 2002). For example, Harrison, Torres, and Kukalis (1988) 
argue that a person holding both CEO and chairperson titles - thus having more structural 
power-is less easily dislodged than a CEO without this dual role. They also found that 
when the positions are separate, there is a greater likelihood of power struggles. Finally, 
Shen and Cannella (2002) found that CEO duality was negatively related to CEO 
. . . 
dismissal. Thus, the CEO wil,l seek to minimize power struggles by obtaining more 
structural power. 
Pfeffer (1981) provides another argument as to how resource dependence theory 
would explain why a CEO would desire to attain more structural power. Pfeffer proposes 
that individuals that provide the most critical and difficult to obtain resources can become , 
the most powerful in organizational relationships. A CEO, then, can become more of an 
integral source of these resources by attaining additiol)al positions of formal power and 
authority, such as chairperson and/or president (Combs & Skill, 2003). Therefore, CEOs 
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that have access to more of the firms' resources have more opportunities to engage in 
personal agendas, and have less likelihood of being challenged by others. 
In summary, both human capital theory and resource dependence theory sugge~t 
that CEOs with high expert and prestige power will have the desire and opportunity to 
increase structural power; thus, these theories are complementary in nature. Therefore, 
based on the above theoretical developments: 
General hypothesis 1: Expert power will have a .positive effect on the CEO's 
structural power, more specifically: 
Hypothesis la: The education level of the CEO will have a positive effect on the 
CEO's.structuralpower. 
Hypothesis lb: The length of .tenure as a CEO will have a positive effect on the 
CEO's structural power. 
Hypothesis le: The length of tenure with the firm will have a positive effect on the 
CEO's structural power. 
General hypothesis 2:. Prestige power 'will have a positive effect on the CEO's 
structural power, more specifically: 
Hypothesis 2a: The amount of elite education obtained by a CEO will have a 
positive effect on the CEO's structural power. 
Hypothesis 2b: The number of directorships held by the CEO will have a positive 
effect on the CEO's structural power. 
Hypothesis 2c: The CEO being the founder will have a positive effect on the CEO's 
structural power. 
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. Interaction Effects of Expert and Prestige Power on Structural Power. 
Besides the direct effects that both expert and prestige power may have on 
structural power, I argue that · expert and prestige powers· will interact to increase the 
likelihood of a CEO attaining more structural power. For example, a seasoned CEO with 
a prestigious external board position will have higher informal power · than a just a 
seasoned CEO (Finkelstein & D' Aveni, 1994). The CEO is seen not only as an important 
figure within the firm ( due to. the experience gained} but also as an important figure 
within the industry ( due to the prestige of board directorship). Similarly, a seasoned CEO 
with a prestigious advanced degree is likely to be viewed as more knowledgeable with 
more prestigious contacts thanjust·a.seasoned CEO. 
Although there has been no study that has tested such relationships, there have 
been studies that have examined the·effects of both expert and prestige power on various 
outcomes. Hitt et al. (2001) provide evidence that both expert and prestige powers 
positively affect firm performance. In · this case, the study showed that prestigious 
education and tenure with the firm both were significant predictors of firm performance. 
Finkelstein (1992) and Daily and Johnson (1997) also found direct relationships between 
expert .and prestige power on various outcomes.· Using three variables to .create a global 
measure of expert power and four variables to create a global measure of prestige power, 
Finkelstein found that both expert and prestige power were valid predictors of firm 
strategic choices, such as acquisitions. While Daily and Johnson's (1997) initial design 
was also to include global measures, they had to adjust the design to individually test 
each variable in order to examine their effects on firm performance. Utilizing this 
method, they, too, were able to find a direct relationship between CEO indicators of 
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power and fimi performance. ·In addition, Finkelstein and D'Aveni (1994) created a 
global measure that incorporated both expert power (i.e., tenure) and prestige power (i.e., 
board directorship appointment) to show their effects·on CEO/board chairman positions. 
Other studies have examined expert and prestige power exclusively to find 
positive effects on outcomes such as promotion. ,For example, Combs and Skills (2003) 
incorporated tenure, a variable · representing expert power to help explain CEO 
compensation. Pennings, Lee, and Van Witteloostuijn (1998) examined two expert 
power variables, tenure and level of education, and their effects -:on firm dissolution. 
Finally, Tharenou (2001) used organizational tenure and education level to determine 
their effects on management promotions. Based on an exhaustive literature search of 
studies incorporating either, but not both, expert and prestige power variables, the 
majority appear to use expert power. There appear to be very few studies that incorporate 
only prestige power variables, such as elite education or directorship appointments. This 
finding may support the importance of the interaction between both expert and prestige 
power. For example, an individual with prestige power, such as a doctorate degree from 
an elite school, will have power, but in combination with several years experience at a 
firm, this individual will be seen as more powerful. In this case, the individual is seen as 
someone who has the. credentials to be powerful due to the prestige of attained education, 
but also someone who can be trusted as a loyal employee due to the time spent and 
experiences gained while employe_d with the firm. ,Thus, prestige education and tenure 
interact to create higher informal power for the individual. 
. In conclusion, I argue that CEO power dimensions are complex constructs that 
likely have interrelationships, which would affect other dimensions of power. Some 
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researchers have understood the importance of including both expert and prestige powers. 
in their designs, while others have used either expert or prestige power exclusively in 
their studies .. I acknowledge the importance of examining the direct effects of th~se 
powers on various outcomes~ as has been done in past· studies, but also suggests that a 
CEO with expert power will have greater capacity to obtain structural power when he or 
she also has prestige power. The reasoning is that expert and prestige powers draw upon 
different dimensions of power (Finkelstein & D' Aveni, 1994). Thus, these variables will 
be seen as complimentary, and will strengthen an individual's informal power base, 
which could then be used to obtain more structural power. 
Hypothesis 3~: The education level of the CEO and the amount of elite education 
obtained by the CEO will interact to predict structural power such that CEOs with 
a higher education level and more elite education will have more structural power. 
Hypothesis 3b: The education level of a CEO and the number of directorships held 
by a CEO will interact to predict ·structural power such that CEOs with a higher 
education level and more directorships will have ~ore structural power. 
Hypothesis 3c: The education level of a CEO and the CEO as the founder of the 
firm will interact to predict structural power such that CEOs with a higher 
education level and founder status will have more structural power. 
Hypothesis 4a: The length of tenure as a CEO and the amount of elite education 
obtained by the CEO will interact to predict structural power such that CEOs with 
longer tenure as a CEO and more elite education will have more structural power. 
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Hypothesis 4b: The length of tenure as a CEO and the number of directorships held 
by a CEO will interact to predict structural power such that CEOs with longer 
tenure as a CEO and more directorships will have more structural power. 
Hypothesis 4c: The length of tenure as a CEO and the CEO as the founder of the 
firm will interact to predict structural power such that CEOs with longer tenure as 
a CEO and founder status will have more structural power. 
Hypothesis Sa: The length of tenure with the firm and the amount of elite education 
obtained by the CEO will interact to predict structural power such that CEOs with 
longer tenure with the firm and more elite education will have more structural 
power. 
Hypothesis Sb: The length of tenure with the firm and the number of directorships 
held by a CEO will interact to predict structural power such that CEOs with longer 
tenure with the firm and more directorships will have more structural power. 
Hypothesis Sc: The length of tenure with firm and the CEO as the founder of the 
firm will interact to predict structural power such that CEOs with longer tenure 
with a firm and founder status will have more structural power. 
Interaction Effects of Board Independence and Expert/Prestige Power on Structural 
Power 
Based on the above arguments relating to both human capital and resource 
dependence theories, the CEO with high expert and prestige powers will have not only 
the capability to obtain more structural power, but also the desire to obtain this power to 
decrease the amount of resistance within the upper echelon ranks. However, firms have 
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·· ·. varying degrees of board independence and thus may react differently when debating if 
the CEO should be conferred additional titles. From an agency theory and managerialist 
perspective, an independent board will be vigilant in limiting this formal power, since 
, CEO structural power has· been shown to lead to entrenchment (Harrison, Torres, & 
Kukalis, 1988), reduce board involvement (Johnson, Hoskisson & Hitt, 1993), and 
restrict the amount of information presented to the board (Mallette & Fowler, 1992). 
Moreo.ver, the CEOs with more structural power have .more influence on board meeting 
agendas (Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994) and will be in a position to influence the 
nomination of directors and others who would likely be loyal to the chief executive (Berg 
& Smith, 1978). In fact, Westphal and Zajac (1995) report that the greater the CEO's 
power, the greater the similarity between the CEO and newly appointed board members. 
As the similarity increases, so does the likelihood that the CEO's aims will go 
unchallenged; hence, this strategy could perpetuate CEO power. Finkelstein and 
D'Aveni (1994) concur, and they argue further that when the CEO has high informal 
powers, vigilant boards will strive to limit CEO structural power by conferring positions 
such as chairperson of the board to an outside executive, thus counterbalancing the 
relative power of the CEO. 
Vigilant boards tend to be composed of outside, independent board members 
(Finkelstein & D' Aveni, 1994). Both types of board members (outsiders and insiders) 
have a duty to ensure that the decisions are made in the best interests. of the shareholders 
(Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996). Yet, an inside director, which is defined as any 
individual that has either worked with top management (former executives) or is 
presently employed by the firm (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992), may feel indebted to the CEO 
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because of his or her employment history with the firm (Patton & Baker, 1987). 
Therefore, while inside directors will have more knowledge of the daily operations, they 
will also be less likely to challenge the CEO or other executives on important proposals 
(Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993). Thus, inside directors are often viewed as those that 
merely rubber.,-stamp CEOs' agendas (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Outside board 
members, however, are not reliant on the CEO for their main source of income. 
Moreover, these board members are not involved in the daily operations of the company 
and will not have to deal with the uneasiness of working closely with a CEO with whom 
they may disagree. 
These independent directors have access to strategic and financial information 
regarding the firm, which enables them to ensure that strategic choices of top executives 
do not overshadow the best interests of the shareholders. In fact, several studies show 
outside board members are more likely than insiders to dismiss CEOs for poor firm 
performance (Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Weisbach, 1988). Moreover, outside directors 
. may have the added incentive of maintaining their own reputations as directors, and 
avoiding the risks of negative exposure or discreditation for duties poorly performed 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). 'Therefore, firms with outside, more independent boards will be 
more vigilant in minimizing the amount of structural power given to the CEO since they 
· have vested interest in limiting the CEO's ability to constrain board independence 
(Baliga, Moyer, & Rao, 1996) and in preserving the board's governance ability 
(Millstein, 1992) .. This vigilance would be particularly salient with CEO's that have 
greater informal power. 
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Agency theory proponents would argue the importance of monitoring a CEO with 
informal power such as expert or prestige power in order to minimize the potential abuse 
by the top executiv:e. Although·no study has directly·analyzed the domain of informal 
CEO powers and their influence on obtaining more structural power (i.e., from a CEO 
and president to a CEO, president ·and chair), there are studies that have clearly shown 
that as employees of a firm increase in informal powers, they do attain more formal 
power (see Debackere & Rappa, 1995; Hurley, Fagenson-Eland, & Soonenfeld, 1997). 
As argued previously, a .CEO will desire to attain more structural power based on both 
agency theory and resource dependence theory. With this desire, a CEO with increased 
informal power will leverage this power to increase structural power. With increased 
structural power, a CEO is likely to have a greater chance to avoid confrontation with 
other executives within the firm due the increased consolidation of formal power. Also, 
with this increased structural power, the CEO will have the capacity to pursue strategic 
choices that may better serve the top executive than the shareholders· of the firm. Thus, 
independ~nt members of the board will monitor the CEO intangible and tangible assets 
such as the expertise gained from the organization and CEO tenure as well as the prestige 
attained from sitting on numerous boards and achieving advance education from elite 
schools. For example, as CEO gains more tenure, the board knows the influence that this 
executive has on the firm and thus will strive to decrease the amount of structural power 
given to the top executive. Similarly, a CEO that is a founder will also have accrued 
influence; thus independent board members will be vigilant in limiting the structural 
power of the CEO, because this power provides greater influence on strategic decisions. 
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· . Hypothesis 6a: The effects of education level of the CEO on structural power are 
contingent on board independence such that the CEO's education level will have 
less effect on structural power with firms that have greater board independence. 
Hypothesis 6b: The effects of length of tenure as a CEO on structural power are 
contingent on board independence such that the length of tenure as a CEO will have 
less effect on structural power with firms that have greater board independence. 
Hypothesis 6c: The effects of length of tenure with the firm on structural power are 
contingent on board independence such that the CEO's organizational tenure will 
have less effect on structural power with firms that have greater · board 
independence. 
Hypothesis 7a: The effects of elite education obtained by the CEO on structural 
power are contingent on board independence such that the CEO's elite education 
will have less effect on structural power with firms that have greater board 
independence. 
Hypothesis 7b: The effects of number of directorships held by a CEP on structural 
power are contingent on. board independence such that the, number of directorships 
held by the CEO will have less effect on structural power with firms that have 
greater board independence. 
Hypothesis 7c: The effects of the CEO as the founder of the firm on structural 
power are contingent on board independence such that founder status will have less 
effect on structural power with firms that have greater board independence. 
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Interaction Effects of Ownership Power and Expert/Prestige Power on Structural 
Power 
Most research has analyzed executive ownership in the context of aligning 
managemenfs interests to that of shareholders (Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Walsh & 
Seward, 1990; Amihud & Lev, 1999; Tosi et al., 2000). Coles, Mc Williams, and Sen 
(2001) argue that as the CEO's ownership increases, there is a greater incentive for the 
CEO to ensure that the strategiesimplemented are in the best interests of the firm, and are 
thus beneficial to the shareholders. 
Ownership can affect a CEO in at least two ways. First, ownership gives the CEO 
increased legitimate power, such as veto or approval, to influence management's 
decisions (Riahi-Belkaoui & Pavlik, 1993). With this legitimate power, the CEO can also 
influence the selection of board directors (Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988). 
Second, Shen and Cannella (2002) argue that ownership enhances the CEO image as a 
loyal employee that will seek the .best interests of the firm, thus increasing the CEO's 
. credibility. 
Research suggests that CEO ownership can have various positive effects on firms' 
strategic choices· (Ryans & Wiggins, 2002). ·For example, many researchers have found 
that executive stock ownership is negatively correlated with unrelated diversification 
(Riahi-Belkaoui & Pavlik,.1993; Denis, Davis, & Sarin, 1997; Anderson, Bates, Bizjak, 
& Lemmon, 2000). Hill and Snell (1988) found that stock ownership by the CEO has 
positive effects on innovation strategies. Finally, Buchholtz and Ribbens (1994) found 
that stock ownership was negatively related to the resistance of finn takeovers. Thus, 
CEO ownership can benefit the strategic policies of a firm. 
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While there are studies that examine the relationship between ownership and 
strategic choice, there are only a few ·. analyses that focus on CEO ownership in the 
context of power. Intuitively, since CEO ownership increases credibility and legitimacy, 
these factors could be used to obtain or retain power. . However, few studies have 
examined whether ownership is used to retain structural power, and there are no studies 
that have analyzed the effects of ownership on the attainment of structural power. 
In a recent field study, Pitcher, Chreim, and Kisfalvi (2000) interviewed ten CEOs 
in the financial se.rvices industry to determine the causes of CEO succession. Results 
showed that CEO ownership was key in retaining the title of CEO. Thus, the authors 
encourage further research into the effects ownership can have on power issues such as 
CEO successibn. In their study, CEOs who had ownership power were able to insulate 
themselves from unexpected or involuntary turnover; thus, they were able to retain the 
structural power already acquired. McEachem (1975), using a larger sample, found 
similar results: CEOs in owner-managed firms were able to hold their CEO position 
significantly longer than CEOs in employee-managed firms. Thus, the CE.O of owner-
managed firms may have greater power to retain his or her position. 
Based on these studies, there is evidence that ownership provides a basis for 
retaining CEO structural power. The CEO understands that gaining more structural 
power is a mean& to becoming more entrenched in the firm. CEO stock ownership 
provides the top executive with legitimate power and creates an image for the CEO as a, 
credible employee that will want only the best for the finh. Therefore~ a CEO with expert 
or prestige power will utilize ownership to leverage the chances to obtain more structural 
power in order to more easily pursue his or her interests with fewer challenges from other 
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executives and non-executive directors. Although previous studies have shown the 
importance of ownership in retaining structural power, I propose that the combination of 
• informal power and formal ownership (i.e., voting) power will result in an increase of 
structural power. 
To conclude, share ownership is the tangible voting rights an individual can 
· exercise to position him/herself to influence firm decisions. Share ownership · forms a 
basis of power to position oneself within the firm, and provides legitimacy to the CEO. 
Inside and outside members of the firm, such as other executives and outside board 
members, may view a CEO with strong ownership ties as a trusted agent for the firm. As 
argued previously, a CEO with expert or prestige power will gain more structural power 
due to his or her own abilities, experiences and. desires. However, a CEO will seek to 
strengthen the power gained through other means by utilizing and drawing upon the 
additional powers of ownership. 
Hypothesis 8a: The effects of education. level of the CEO on structural power are 
contingent on ownership power such that the CEO's education level .will have more 
effect on structural powe.r for CEOs with greater ownership. · 
Hypothesis 8b: The effects of length of tenure as a CEO on structural power are 
contingent on ownership power such that the CEO's length of tenure as a CEO will 
have more effect on structural power for CEOs with greater ownership. 
Hypothesis 8c: The effects of length of tenure with a firm on structural power are 
contingent on ownership power such. that the CEO's organizational tenure will have 
more effect on structural power for CEOs with greater ownership. 
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Hypothesis 9a: The effects of elite education · obtained by the CEO on structural 
power are contingent on ownership power such that the CEO's elite education will 
have more effect on·structural power for CEOs with greater ownership. 
Hypothesis 9b: The effects of number of directorships held by a CEO on structural 
power are contingent on own~rship power such that the number of directorships 
held by the CEO will have more effect- on structural power for CEOs with greater 
ownership. 
Hypothesis 9c: The effects of the CEO as . the founder of the firlli on structural 
power are contingent on ownership power such that founder status will have more 
effect on structural power for CE.Os with greater ownership. 
The Effects of Structural Power on Strategic Choice 
To date, most structural power research has'. focused on CEO auality.·· There has 
only been one empirical study designed to determine the explanatory significance of 
structural power in a range of high profile positions.·. Finkelstein (1992) designed his 
study to determine the predictability of the various .dimensions of executive powers and 
to ascertain whether or not structural power (number of titles) would predict 
organizational outcomes, such as, acquisitions.· I take the broader view of CEO power by 
examining not only the traditional dual role of CEO/chairperson, but also other forms of 
executive · power, such. as president or chief operating officer or other important 
organizational titles. 
While the effects. of CEO duality on major constructs such as firm performance 
appear mixed (Boyd, 1995), CEO · duality seems to affect organizational strategic 
decisions. For example, a study performed.by Mallette.and Fowler (1992) examining 
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U.S. public firms found that firms with CEO duality were more likely to adopt a "poison 
pill" than firms with a separation between the CEO and board chairperson. Others have 
found an association between CEO duality and corporate diversification (Zantout & 
O'Reilly, 1996) .. Pollock, Fischer, and Wade (2002) found that firms with CEO duality 
were more likely to have increased option pricing than firms whose CEOs did not hold 
· the chair position, thus benefiting executives with options. Magnan, St-Onge and 
Calloc 'h ( 1999) found that CEO duality was significantly related to CEO compensation. 
Finally, Hayward ~d Hambrick (1997) found that firms with CEO duality paid greater 
takeover premiums during acquisitions than firms with separate CEO/chair positions. 
Therefore, CEO duality is seen as an indictor of power that can influence important 
corporate decisions (Sridharan & St. John; 1998). 
Besides the power that is associated with the board chair position, there are other 
important and structurally powerful positions, such. as the president (Combs & Skills, 
2002) or the chief operating officer (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Child (1972) 
suggests that those with high structural power will have more influence on decision-
making. Therefore, CEOs will .increase their power by obtaining further high-profile 
positions within the firm. With the additional concentration of power gained from 
. 
multiple titles, CEOs could influence the make-up of the board, while increasing 
information asymrpetry to create less effective board monitoring, which could lead the 
CEO to engage in strategic choices that may not be in the best interest of the firm (Cole, , 
McWilliams, & Sen, 2001; Tosi et al., 2000). 
Diversification is one strategic choice in particular that'would provide the CEO 
with substantial benefits.. Top executives can diversify their finns in either a related or 
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unrelated mariner (Palepu, ·1985). Related diversification strategies have become popular 
because of the value created when firms increase or extend their resource base, thus 
gaining economies of scope. (Capon, Hulbert; Farley, & Martin, 1988). Unrelat~d 
diversification strategies focus not on synergistic effects (Palepu, 1985) but on exploiting 
untapped markets, rescuing · declining firms, or financial risk reduction (Eisenmann, 
2002). Each diversification strategy can create value (Capon et aL, 1988). Yet, studies on 
diversification have shown that .the benefits gained from diverse units decrease as the 
firm's operations become more.· complex (Pali ch;. Cardinal, & Miller, 2000). Therefore, 
there has been a .reduction in these conglomerate-type organizational structures 
(Eisemriann, 2002). 
From an agency perspective, executives would desire their firms to engage in 
diversification strategies to reduce management employment risk (Amihud & Lev, 1981; 
Zajac & Westphal, 1996). From a managerialist perspective, CEOs would employ these 
strategies to increase firm size, and thus obtain greater compensation (Zajac & Westphal, 
1996). Both diversification strategies (related and unrelated) necessitate a CEO with the 
ability to command a more complicated organization, and require a CEO with a broader 
knowledge and higher skills than a CEO overseeing a less complex organization 
(Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998). Thus, both related and unrelated diversification strategies 
would lead to higher salaries and greater prestige. Besides the necessary abilities of the 
CEO to run this complex organization, the more diversified.the firm, the more potential 
for information asymmetry between top management and the shareholders, thus 
increasing the chance for agency costs and CEO power abuse (Elloumi & Gueyie, 2001). 
This increase in organizational complexity provides the top, executives an opportunity to 
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take advantage of firms with multiple strategic business units by making self-interested 
decisions (Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Westphal & Zajac, 1997). Others have suggested 
that diversified firms can be · influenced by top executives who use "information 
overload" that can create deceit within the lower ranks of management (Hoskisson, Hitt, 
& Hill, 1991 ). There is the possibility for even greater . information asymmetry in 
diversified firms that are led by CEOs with multiple positions, since these powerful 
leaders would be privy to information that may not reach the corporate board. Thus, the 
risk ,of self-serving decisions in these complex firms could be particularly salient with 
CEOs who have the greater structural power and authority of additional upper executive 
titles. Therefore, from both agency theory and managerialist perspectives, structurally 
powerful CEOs will engage in diversified strategies in order to create a non-transparent · 
corporation so they can more easily pursue personal agendas, such as increased 
compensation or decreased employment risk. 
In addition to diversification .strategies, a CEO may choose to avoid activities 
deemed as risky from ah employment perspective, such as research and development 
(R&D) initiatives, since the benefits of these decisions may not be financially rewarding 
to the CEO in the short term (Carpenter, 2000). Previous research has shown that the 
failure rate in investment strategies such as R&D could be as high as eighty percent (Hill 
& Snell, 1989). Yet, scholars have theorized that R&D investments play a critical role in 
determining a firm's productivity growth (Long & Ravenscraft, 1993) and innovation 
(Hill & Snell, 1989). Agency theorists suggest that in employee-managed firms, top 
executives are risk-averse and thus will seek to maintain short run profits at the expense 
of strategies that have elements of risk but would likely benefit the firm on a long-term 
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basis (Eisenmann, · 2002). For example, Hill and Snell (1988) found a positive 
relationship between greater CEO ownership of the firm and investment in research and 
development. Thus, CEOs with a long-term interest in the firm were more likely to 
engage their .firms in R&D. These types of strategies bring variability and uncertainty to 
cash flow management, and are thus a risk to executives that seek to maximize short-term 
profits (Ryan & Wiggins, 2002); While there are few studies that have a design that 
. incorporates the CEO's influence on R&D investments, existing studies do support that 
executives risk personal benefits such as higher compensation if they pursue in intense 
research and development (Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Ryan & Wiggins, 2002). 
Balkin, Markman and Gomez-Mejia (2000) state, for example, that in some industries, 
CEOs were not rewarded for engaging in intense R&D strategies, and thus risked 
detrimental effects on compensation if these strategies failed to benefit the firm in the 
. short term. 
Thus, from both agency and managerialist perspectives, CEOs with structural 
power will select strategies that are designed to minimize risks associated with their 
personal interests, such as their employment and compensation packages. By engaging in 
diversification, a CEO can decrease employment risk while increasing his or her 
compensation. In fact, some researchers argue that since CEOs have limited resources 
within the firm, these executives divert resources from high risk (high failure) strategies, 
such as investments in research and development, to lower risk strategies, such as 
diversification (Hill & Snell, 1989). By limiting personal risk investments, such as R&D, 
the CEO can continue the status quo (Carpenter, 2000). Thus, CEOs with more structural 
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power will implement strategies that minimize their personal risk· while maximizing their . 
personal wealth. 
Hypothesis 1 Oa: Structural power will have a positive effect on diversification. 
Hypothesis 10b: Structural power will have a negative effect on research and 
development investments. 
Interaction Effects of Structural Power and Board lndependen·ce on · Strategic 
Choice 
I argue that the effects of CEO power on a firm's strategic choices will depend on 
certain governance factors. An important research question to be addressed is whether 
there are adequate governance mechanisms in place to ensure that CEOs do not unfairly 
take advantage of their structural power to pursue strategic choices that create a more 
complex diversified organization or to reduce investments in R&D in order to minimize 
the associated personal risks. 
As mentioned previously, from an agency or managerialist perspective, an 
executive has self-interest biases that could cause them to pursue diversification 
. strategies to reduce their employment risk,· increase status and compensation (Zajac & 
Westphal, 1996), or reduce R&D expenditures to lessen risk of failure in such 
.investments (Hill, Hitt, & Hoskisson, 1988). There is evidence that CEO self-interest 
biases may promote strategic choices that may not be beneficial to organizations. Hill 
and Snell (1988) found that · when stockholders dominated the corporation, business 
strategies generally focused ort building wealth (i.e., innovation . and research and 
development). When corporations were dominated by executives, however, strategies 
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· tended to center on issues such as employment security. Recent analyses by Amihud and 
Lev (1999) and Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1999) confirm Amihud and Lev's (1981) 
original agency cost perspective that owner-dominated firms were less likely to engage in 
unrelated diversification strategies than employee-dominated firms. Although 
researchers such as Lane, Cannella, and' Lubatkiri (1998) downplay the ·explanatory 
power of agency theory in strategic management, they do agree that top executives will . 
carry some biases or self-interests into the realm of corporate decision-making. 
Given the self-interest biases of the CEO, the firm must ensure that it has 
· adequate governance mechanisms to minimize these biases. The board of directors is an 
important governance body that is in place to . ensure that strategic choices adopted by 
management are. beneficial to the shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The relationship 
between boards of directors and organizational outcom~s, such as firm· performance, has 
been extensively researched (Pearce & Zahra, 1992). Yet, the consensus of tenable 
relationships between board effects on firm performance·is mixed (Dalton,et al., 1998). 
Dalton an~ colleagues do not dismiss a possible link between board composition and firm 
performance; rather, they advocate a finer-grained · approach, such as looking at 
subcommittees' influence on organizations. Because of the difficulty in establishing a 
direct relationship between board composition and firm performance, I will examine the 
influence board strength can have on the CEO's power to pursue antecedents of 
performance, namely business strategy. 
There is support for the merit of independent board members in firms, particularly 
firms that have powerful executives. In a study on U.S. bank holding companies, strong 
boards were given higher monitoring potential when firms had dominant top managers 
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. (Rediker & Seth, 1995). Moreover., Judge and Zeithaml. (1992) found a· positive 
relationship between boards that were dominated by outside members and overall board 
involvement in corporate decision-making .. In addition, others have shown that markets 
have . a positive reaction to the announcement of poison pills when there is a good 
representation of outside directors (Brickely, Coles, & Terry, 1994). The fact that the 
stock market would act positively to takeovers shows the trust shareholders have in 
. outside directors (Davis, 1991), which is highlighted by the fact that outside directors are 
more often appointed to organizations that have shown poor financial performance 
(Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988). Thus, outside board members are seen as important 
governance bodies. 
To date, governance mechanisms such as boards of directors have been shown to 
affect some organizational outcomes. Hill and Snell (1988) found that the ratio of 
outside board members to total board members was positively associated with board 
involvement in restructuring. Evidence suggests that a greater proportion of outsiders on 
the board is associated with an increased likelihood that the board will replace the CEO 
after a period of poor corporate performance (Newman & Moses, 1999). Cannella and 
Shen (2001) showed that under conditions of low performance, firms with stronger 
boards were less likely to follow heir apparent promotions. Furthermore, Zantout and 
O'Reilly-Allen (1996) examined 102 takeovers to find that the probability of engaging in 
conglomerate diversification strategies decreased as the ratio of outside board members 
increased. However, there appears to be no study that has examined the effects of a 
vigilant board on a structurally powerful CEO in relation to strategic choices such as 
diversification or R&D. In Zantout and O'Reilly-Allen's study, their focus was not on 
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· executive power per se, but on the composition of boards in corporations engaging in 
conglomerate strategies versus corporations that did not engage in such strategies. 
As mentioned previously, powerful CEOs may want to engage in complex 
diversification strategies and avoid risky strategies such as R&D investments.. Yet, 
directors have a duty to ensure that executive interests are aligned with shareholders 
interests. Outside, more vigilant directors are more apt to challenge strategic choices that 
are not conducive to the long-term benefit of the firm. .With the vigilance and authority 
given to directors to ratify strategic choices, a powerful CEO's influence will likely be 
· diminished, and thus unwise strategic choices will be minimized. 
Hypothesis 1 la: The effects of structural power on diversification are contingent on 
board independence such that powerful CEOs will lead their firms to fewer 
diversification strategies when firms have greater board ~,idependence. 
Hypothesis llb: The effects of structural power on diversification are contingent on 
board independence such that powerful CEOs will lead their firm to sp.end more on 
research and development investments when firms have greater board 
independence. · 
Structural Power as a Mediator 
Child (1972) argues that CEO power is a central predictor of strategic choice. 
Finkelstein (1992) and others have provided empirical support that executive power is 
associated with some forms of strategic choice. In his study, Finkelstein ( 1992) found 
that both structural power and prestige power were important predictors of strategic 
acquisitions (diversification) .. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) found CEO tenure was 
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positively related . to strategic · choices such as imitating other firm strategies or 
incorporating risk-averse strategies. Hambrick and Mason (1984) developed a model that 
highlights the effects of top executives on strategic choices such as diversification and 
innovation, and discovered that an executive's functional experiences, tenure and 
education positively effected the strategic choices of a firm such as product innovation, 
. acquisitions and unrelated diversification. Michel and. Hambrick (1992) found that 
executive tenure was associated with firm diversification. Finally, Wiersema and Bantel 
(1992) observed that executive tenure and educational level were positively related to 
changes in diversification. 
Other researchers have incorporated CEO power variables to provide empirical 
support that certain powers held by the CEO positively effect firm performance. Daily 
and Johnson (1997) found that number of directorships, founder status and education 
level were positively related to firm performance. Others have examined the effects that 
elite education and organizational tenure of executives can have on firm performance to 
find a positive relationship (Hitt et al., 2001). 
All these studies follow Finkelstein' s (1992) · basic design that executive power is 
multi-faceted, and that specific forms of power can directly affect strategic management 
topics such as strategic choice and firm performance. These designs treat the dimensions 
of power as same level variables without examining both the indirect and direct effects 
these variables can have on strategic choice. I argue that it is extremely important to 
examine not only the direct effects of multi-dimensions of CEO power, but also study the 
indirect effects and interaction of these dimensions. As discussed previously, a CEO will 
attain more structural power due to his/her abilities, experiences, and desires. With this 
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increased . structural power, the top executive has decreased the likelihood of 
confrontations due to the increased legitimate and formal power, if the CEO is also the 
president and chair. If the CEO has only one title (CEO), then there will be arguably 
more confrontations and power struggles between the CEO and other executives who also 
have substantial power, such . as the chairperson of the board and president. Less 
confrontations and power struggles will lead to more CEO influence on important 
strategic decisions such as diversification or investment in R & D. 1 argue that from a 
theoretical basis, the CEO will leverage the possessed informal powers in order to gain 
· more formal ·power, and in turn become more influential in determining the firm's 
strategic choices. This increased influence is due to the decrease of other executives who 
-would have filled those responsibilities (i.e., pres.ident or chairperson) and the increase of 
authority and responsibilities in the decision making of the firm's strategic choices. 
Thus, expert and prestige power will indirectly affect strategic choice through their 
effects on structural power. In other words, both types of informal power will lead to 
increases in structural power and will provide the CEO with legitimate authority to 
influence ~orporate decisions such as strategic choice. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 12a: The effects of the CEO's education level on diversification are 
mediated by structural power. 
Hypothesis 12b: The effects of tenure as.a CEO on diversification are mediated by 
structural power. 
Hypothesis 12c: The effects. of the CEO'.s organizational tenure on diversification 
are mediated by structural power. 
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Hypothesis 12d: The effects of the CEO's elite education on diversification are 
mediated by structural power. 
Hypothesis 12e: The effects of the number of directorships held by a CEO on 
diversification are mediated by structural power. 
Hypothesis 12f: The effects of founder status on diversification are mediated by 
structural power. 
Hypothesis 13a: The effects of the CEO's education level on R&D investments are 
mediated by structural power. 
Hypothesis 13b: The effects of tenure as the CEO on R&D investments are 
mediated by structural power. 
Hypothesis 13c: The effects of the CEO's organizational tenure on R&D 
investments are mediated by structural power. 
Hypothesis 13d: The effects of elite education on R&D investments are mediated by 
structural power. 
Hypothesis 13e: The effects of the number of directorships held by a CEO on R&D 
investments are mediated by structural power. 
Hypothesis 13f: The effects of founder status on R&D investments are mediated by 
structural power. 
Methodology 
Sample 
To test the above hypotheses, data were collected from large public companies. 
The reasons for the choice of this sample are fourfold. First, the data necessary for this 
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dissertation are readily available in various sources since these corporations are public 
entities, and, thus provide sensitive information, such as financial data that would be 
otherwise less available from private firms;· Second, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) 
argue that· gathering executive power data via surveys or interviews is highly sensitive 
and ·· difficult to collect, and that primary data on executive power has experienced 
problems such as content and convergent validity. Third, Hoskisson and Turk (1990) 
argue that there . is a greater likelihood that larger firms will engage in diversification 
strategies ( a dependent variable) than smaller firms; thus, public firms, which are 
generally large corporations, would likely provide data with a wider variety of 
diversification strategies than. smaller, private eompanies. Fourth, archival data from the 
typical executive databases, such as Compustat and Execucomp have been shown to be 
highly reliable and valid measures (Finkelstein &. Hambrick, 1996). Compustat, for 
example, provides an objective system of categorizing that allows managers to determine 
appropriate business segments in which to categorize these organizations (Comment & 
Jarrell, 1995). 
Recently, the average archival sample size for executive research was 152 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). I randomly selected 300 companies. There are many 
reasons for this larger sample. First, Joreskog and Sorbom (1993) suggest the following 
equation to determine the minimum sample, n (n-1 )/2, where n = number of variables. 
The number of variables in this design is 13, with a minimum suggested sample of 78; 
thus a 300 sample exceeds the suggested minimum. Second, a larger sample size will 
help minimize departures from normality (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). 
Third, a larger sample means more statistical power. Statistical power, or the probability 
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of correctly rejecting a null hypothesis,' should be of prime concern for researchers. In 
fact, Cohen (1992) suggests that a major concern in management research is the failure to 
incorporate power analysis in research designs. Although sample size or n is only one 
parameter of statistical power, obtaining a large sample size is the goal of this project. It 
should be noted however, that the larger the sample, the higher the probability of 
nonsampling errors, so there is a point of marginal utility, since a large sample may 
provide support for statistical significance but be void of practical significance. 
Data Collection 
The design incorporates secondary data. Compustat provides information for all 
publicly traded companies and is a main source of data collection. Another source 
utilized is corporation proxy statements that must meet stringent governmental 
guidelines, since this publicly available information must be accurate and reliable. The 
Execucomp database is another well-used archival source that is incorporated in the 
design. In addition, Fortune.com has a website that provides useful public information, 
which is also utilized. 
Measures 
Independent Variables 
Expert Power - Expert power is based on an executive's ability to deal with industry 
factors and contribute to the organization's success. Three items are used to tap into this 
construct, namely, the CEO's tenure as a CEO (Combs & Skills, 2003), the CEO's tenure 
with the firm in any capacity, and the CEO's level of education (Hitt et al., 2001). 
Buchholtz, Young, and Powell (1988) argue that the CEO accumulates important 
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knowledge ofthe firm's activities that provides him or her with expertise. In addition, a 
CEO increases in expert power as he/she gains "personal mystique" and loyalty from 
others (Pfeffer, 1981). CEO/organizational tenure is measured in two ways: the number 
of years the executive has been the CEO and the number of years the executive has been 
with the firm. Literature provides strong evidence that education is related to abilities 
(Becker, 1993), and is an important indicator of abilities (Miller & Wiseman, 2001). The 
level of education is measured by the number of years of college education (i.e., 2 years 
for a diploma, 4 years for an undergraduate degree, 2 years for a master's degree, 3 years 
for a juris doctorate, and 5 years for a doctor of philosophy). CEO/organizational tenure 
and level of education were collected from the Fortune.com website, Execucomp and 
proxy statements. 
Prestige Power - Prestige power is based on an executive's reputation in the institutional 
environment and among stakeholders (Finkelstein, 1992). Three items will be used for 
this power dimension-elite education, corporate directorships on which the CEO serves 
and founder status (Finkelstein, 1992; Daily & Johnson, 1997). Elite. education is an 
important'factor, which adds legitimacy and prestige to the firm (Daily & Johnson, 1997). 
Elite education is measured by determining whether the CEO attended a high-status 
school, according to the listing of prestigious schools provided by Finkelstein (1992). 
Following Finkelstein (1992), this variable is measured as 1 if the CEO had no college 
degree; 2 if no degree(s) was/were elite; 3 if one undergraduate or graduate degree, but 
not both, were elite; and 4 if both undergraduate and graduate degrees were elite. 
However, I dropped a firm if the CEO had no college degree (i.e., 1 in the elite education 
category and O in the level of education category) due to the problems of correlating these 
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two variables. In addition to elite education, participation in corporate boards provides 
prestige to CEOs through the connections and knowledge gained from external sources 
(Useem, 1979; Pennings, ·1980). This variable is measured by the number of for-profit 
boards on which the CEO serves. Founder status is the indication of attachment a CEO 
may have to the firm and the prestige associated with that position (Nelson, 2003). The 
founder can become the focal point of the firm; someone that is influential in defining the 
vision and mission of the firm (Vesper, 1996; Gimeno et al., 1997). Thus, such influence 
is defined as more informal than the traditional formal power, since founder influence is 
not directly related to a CEO's formal position within the firm such as ownership (voting) 
and structural (legitimate) power. This variable is categorical and measured as O if the 
CEO is not the founder and 1 if the CEO is the founder of the firm (Finkelstein, 1992; 
Daily & Johnson, 1997). Elite education, corporate directorship and founder status 
information were collected through Fortune.com and proxy statements. 
Ownership Power - Ownership power is based on an executive's capacity as an agent 
acting on behalf of shareholders (Finkelstein, 1992). One item will be used to represent 
this construct, namely percentage of the firm's outstanding shares owned by the CEO 
(Finkelstein, 1992). CEO stockholdings, an indication of formal power, is the physical 
ownership that CEOs may use to influence organizational matters. This measure is the 
percentage of CEOs' shares as compared to the total outstanding shares (Daily & 
Johnson, 1997). Stock ownership information was collected from ExecuComp. 
Board Independence - One item is used as an indicator of board independence: 
percentage of independent board members. Percentage of independent board members is 
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used less frequently as an indicator for board independence than percentage of outside 
board members. The former, researchers argue, has fewer ties to the CEO since 
independent board members are not appointed by the CEO (Daily & Johnson, 1997; 
Wade, O'Reilly, & Chandratat, 1990). This measure will be collected by dividing the 
number of outside board members appointed before the CEO became the top executive 
by the total number of.directors. This variable will be collected from the corporations' 
proxy statements. 
Dependent Variables 
Structural Power -'- Structural power. is based on formal organizational structure and 
hierarchal authority. This measurement, however, is different from Finkelstein's (1992) 
measurement of structural power, which is operationalized by the number of titles held by 
the CEO. Finkelstein's (1992) measurement indicates that more executive titles equals 
greater structural power (Bigley & Wiersema, 2002). I suggest that a CEO could hold 
two titles, one being the CEO and president, while the other being CEO and chair, yet the 
latter would arguably have more structural power. The CEO is the most. powerful 
position in the firm (Bigley & Wiersema, 2002). The president, while having many 
responsibiliti\;:s concerning the operations of the firm, still reports to the CEO and is 
usually in line to be the CEO heir (Cannella & Shen, 2001). The chairperson of the board 
is responsible for organizing and overseeing board meetings, and the hiring or firing of 
the CEO (Conyon & Peck, 1998); thus, the position of chairperson is independent of the 
CEO and does not report to the CEO. Therefore, the CEO who is appointed chairperson 
will have greater responsibilities, authority and independence than the CEO/president. 
Structural power, then, is measured as follows: 1 if CEO; 2 if CEO and president or 
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COO; 3 if CEO and chairman; 4 if CEO, president and chairman. This variable will be 
collected from ExecuComp and the corporations' proxy statements. 
Strategic Choice 
Diversification - There are three measures of diversification, namely related, unrelated, 
and total diversification. This design will incorporate all three measurements of 
diversification. To calculate diversification, an entropy measurement will be used that 
was developed by Palepu (1985). Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, and Moesel (1993) tested 
Palepu's measurement for construct validity and found that it was more appropriate than 
Rumelt's diversification scale. Rumelt's approach to measurement, which involves 
classification of strategies, is both time-consuming and potentially subjective 
(Varadarajan & Ramanujam, 1987). Palepu's measurement provides a continuous, 
versus dichotomous, variable that supplies a richer, more fine-grained analysis. The 
basic equation of the entropy measure is 
Total diversification= I: P1 ln (1/Pj) 
where P is defined as the sales attributed to business segment J, and ln(l/Pj) is the 
logarithm of the inverse of sales. The analysis used in this dissertation will include the 
related, unrelated and total diversification indices. To obtain information regarding 
diversification chosen by a firm, Compustat will be used to obtain a breakdown of sales 
for each company by industry. 
Research and Development Investments - R&D investments play a critical role in 
determining a firm's productivity (Long & Ravenscraft, 1993). This variable will be 
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measured using the annual R&D expenditures of the firm divided by total sales (Long & 
Ravenscraft, 1993). Compustat will be the database used to collect the data. 
Control Variables 
Control variables incorporate both firm level and CEO related factors, which are 
relevant for CEO power studies (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998). The firm level variables 
include firm size and past firm performance. If past performance is high, it may provide 
the CEO with greater opportunity to attain more structural power and/or set firm strategic 
decisions. fu general, the CEO is seen as the most influential member of an 
organization's success or failure (Barkema & Pennings, 1998; Bigley & Wiersema, 2002; 
Daily & Johnson, 1997). Thus, high performance of a firm is likely seen as an attribution 
of the CEO design, which could equate to an increase in structural power and a greater 
influence of the CEO to affect strategic choice. Firm size is measured by the logarithm 
of sales (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Geletkanycz, Boyd, & Finkelstein, 2001). The 
logarithmic of firm size is used to minimize heteroscedasticity (Finkelstein & D' Aveni, 
1994). Past firm performance will be measured by return on equity (Daily, Johnson, 
Ellstrand, & Dalton, 1998; Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998). Board size will be used as a CEO 
related factor. Board characteristics, such as board size, are important indicators of a 
firm's passive or vigilant monitoring of the CEO and the other executives (Wright, Kroll, 
& Elenkov, 2002). Thus, the larger the board, the more difficult it may be for the CEO to 
pursue his/her agenda. 
fu some strategic management studies, industry has been shown to be an 
important control variable. For example, it has been shown to explain considerable 
variance in some areas such as firm performance (Wemerfelt & Montgomery, 1988; 
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Miller & · Cardinal, 1994). Based on both theoretical and methodology reasoning, 
however, I have not decided to control for industry. There is no rationale why one 
industry would have CEOs with greater structural power than other industries. Recent 
studies that have incorporated power variables have not controlled for industry 
(Finkelstein, 1992; Daily & Dalton, 1997; Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998). In fact, I did an 
initial analysis with industry effects on the front half of the model, to find very little 
effects (i.e., no industry showing significance) and no differences in the interpretation of 
the results; thus i~dustry effects will not be formally addressed with structural power as 
the dependent variable since there seems to be little merit in giving up so many degrees 
of freedom 1• In addition, there appears to be very little rationale to control for industry 
based on the second half of the model since. the entropy measure already factors in 
industry related data. Again, I did an initial analysis with industry effects on the second 
half of the model, to- find similar results (i.e., no industry showing significance). 
Data Analysis 
I seek to examine relationships that are exploratory in nature. There has been no 
study in strategic management that has tested the relationship between expert and.prestige 
power and th,eir effects on CEO structural power. Nor has there been a design structure 
that incorporates interactions of these CEO powers and governance conditions. With the 
intent of establishing associations among these various constructs, I will incorporate a 
1 There are 13 industry dummy variables based on the Standard Industrial 
Classification Code (SIC) that represents major industries. 1 = Chemical/renewable 
resources; 2 = Construction; 3 = Food/beverage processing; 4 = Clothing/fabric 
processing; 5 = Manufacturing of household goods; 6 = Publishing and printing; 7 = 
Manufacturing of rubber, plastic; glass, concrete and steel; 8 = Manufacturing of 
equipment/machinery; 9 = Manufacturing of specialty equipment; 10 = Transportation; 
11 = Wholesale; 12 = Retail; 13 = Services. 
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large cross-sectional design. Cross-sectional designs are common in executive 
compensation literature (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989). 
Although a longitudinal design may provide stronger support for causfil 
relationships, there are issues that balance the cross-sectionaVlongitudinal debate. Some 
of these issues are that this design is very complex and new (in the context of CEO 
power), and that panel designs incorporate only a few measurement periods. To date, 
most longitudinal studies include time-series designs with multiple data points ranging 
from· relatively few "persons, objects, or organizations", to panel designs with large 
samples but only a few data points (Mitchell & James, 2001); a cross-sectional design 
should provide . important knowledge that can be further expanded using more 
sophisticated designs. Answering questions such as how informal power ( expert and 
prestige) and structural power are associated, and addressing issues such as the role of an 
independent board in decreasing the likelihood of a CEO attaining other executive titles 
can provide valuable information for CEO research. 
Descriptive Data 
I did not create an overall index for each dimension of power (i.e., combining 
CEO tenure and level of education), as has been done in past designs (See Finkelstein, 
1992, Finkelstein & D 'Aveni, 1994, and Hitt et. al, 2001 ). Global measures can make it 
more difficult to interpret which indicators are contributing to the significance of the 
model and in which direction (positive or negative) these indicators are influencing the 
results. I incorporate a more fined-grained approach by testing separately each indicator 
(i.e., CEO tenure, founder status, etc.). With this design, it is easier to interpret the 
significance (and direction) of each indicator of informal power. 
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The first analysis that is performed is the scatter plot comparing the individual 
independent variables to the dependent variable to determine if there are any potential 
linear relationships between the independent and dependent variables. Another tool used 
to determine if there is normality in the variables is the normal P-P plot. A "snake like" 
pattern would be ideal; if not this pattern, there will be transformations such as the 
inverse and logarithm approaches. Finally, I prepared another plot comparing 
studentized residual and standardized predicted value of the dependent variable to ensure 
that ,there are no patterns (such as a cone shape or curvilinear) in the plot, and to thus 
determine homogeneity of variance. 
Pearson product-moment correlations were examined to determine the extent to 
which the independent variables correlate with the dependent variables. This table ~ 
provides a very general analysis as to the relationship and possible correlation between 
the variables. This table will also show if there is potential for multicollinearity. 
Regression Analysis 
· To test the front half of the model, with structural power as the dependent 
variable, ordinal regression will be used as the statistical analysis. Ordinal regression is 
regression technique that is appropriate when the dependent variable has more than two 
levels and does not have ratio-scaled (or deemed as continuous) properties (Delios & 
Beamish, 2001), whereas independent variables can be both continuous and categorical. 
The dependent variable, structural power, does have some characteristics of a continuous 
variable in that it there is an order of greater structural power for each level of structural 
power (i.e., CEO and president has greater structural power than just the CEO) but the 
difference in the changes of the level of structural power from CEO to CEO and president 
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versus the changes of the level of structural power from CEO and president to CEO and 
chairperson would not be not equivalent. Although it would be appealing to use 
. multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression because of its wide use and its 
relatively easy statistical technique, it is not appropriate given an ordinal dependent 
variable (Peel, Goode, & Moutinho, 1998). SPSS versions, 10 and· greater. include a 
statistical program called polytomous universal model "PLUM", which allows SPSS to 
examine ordinal dependent variables (DeCarlo, · 2003). This · design for statistical 
technique is credited to McCullagh (1980). 
The general equation for ordinal regression, using ordered lo git procedures is: 
P(i) = F(a+ X' (3) = 1/1 + e -(a+ x· (3) 
Where I= 1, 2, 3, 4 for the different levels of structural power; a is the intercept term, X' 
(3 is the vector of coefficients multiplied by the vector of the variables, and P{i) is the 
probability of the outcome of i. {Agarwal, Davis, & Ward, 2001). The significance of 
each level of the dependent is uninteresting but is necessary to calculate the predicted 
. values for the independent variables (See website http://pytheas.ucs.indiana.edu; 
Bowman & Narayandas, 2001; Delios & Beamish, 2001; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). 
The assumptions are less stringent than for OLS regression particularly concerning the 
normality and linearity of the predictors (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). In addition, I 
center the means of the independent variables, which is done in order to minimize the 
effects of multicollinearity (Tabachnick & Fidell,· 2001 ). 
To test hypotheses 1 and 2, which examine the effects that expert power and 
prestige power will have on structural power, the initial step in the ordinal regression 
analysis is to control for firm size, firm performance and board size. The second step 
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includes the expert power measures (level of education, CEO tenure,· and organizational 
tenure} and prestige power measures ( elite education, founder status, and number of 
directorships), as well as percentage of ownership and percentage of board members who 
are independent. · Expert and prestige power variables are not global measures but are 
included in the equations as separate indicators (i.e.; CEO tenure, level of education). 
Hypotheses 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 include three moderated models. The moderated 
regression analysis is used to determine the extent to which a moderator variable changes 
. the relationship between an independent and dependent variable (Aiken & West, 1991). 
The three models are tested as follows: The first moderated· model examines the 
interaction between education level, CEO tenure and organizational tenure (forms of 
expert power); and elite education, number of directorships and founder status (forms of 
prestige power) to determine the effects of such interactions on structural power. The 
first step in ordinal regression analysis is to cofitrol for firm size, firm performance and 
board size. Second, independent variables (3 expert power measures and 3 prestige 
power m~asures) are entered into the equation. Lastly, 9 interaction terms (3 expert 
power measures* 3 prestige power measures) are factored in. The other two moderated 
models follow identical steps as the first, only the interactions will be different (3 expert 
power measures * percentage of independent boards and 3 prestige power measures * 
percentage of independent boards; 3 expert power measures * percentage of CEO 
ownership and 3 prestige power measures * percentage of ownership). At each step, the 
regression coefficients are examined to determine their significance in the equation 
(Cohen & Cohen, 1983). To determine the statistical significance of moderating effects, 
ordinal regression does not use the squared multiple correlation coefficient (R2) but 
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incorporates the change in chi"'square test (Bentler & Bonnett,.1980) . .To determine if the 
importance of the individual independent variables to the overall model, the -2LL log 
likelihood test is performed by determining the degrees of freedom gained from model 1 
to inodel 2 and then comparing the chi square difference of the two models to determine 
if there is a significant difference. The smaller the -2LL values·, the better the model fit 
(Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). Jf the difference of chi-square is at or above 
the critical value of chi-square (i.e.; based on p value of .05, 01, 001) then there is a 
significant relationship and thus the increase in independent variables are important in the 
model. If the difference of chi-square is below the critical value of chi-square then there 
is a non-significant relationship and thus the· added independent variables do not add 
value to the -model, which means ·.the more par,simonious model would be best model 
(DeCarlo, 2003). Also, the .. $trength of association measure that is used is a pseudo r-
squared that is similar to r-squared in multiple· regression but does not have the same 
variance interpretation (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The Mcfadden's pseudo r-squared 
- is generally lower than the other measures, .Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke. As well, the 
latter two pseudo r-square measures factor in sample size. 
Multiple regression analysis is used to test hypotheses related to the second half 
-of the model, which are 10a and 10b. To test hypotheses 10a and 10b, which examine the 
effects structural power will have on diversification -and R&D investments, the first step 
in multiple regression analysis is to control for firm size,· firm performance and board 
size, as well as· percentage· of CEO ownership: Secondly, structural power, as well as 
percentage of independent directors, is included in the· equation to determine if structural 
power is a predictor of strategic choice ( diversification and R&D investments). 
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Moderated regression is used to test hypotheses 1 la and 1 lb. To test hypothesis 
1 la, I examine the interaction effects of board independence and structural power on 
diversification ( one form of strategic choice). The first step in multiple regression 
analysis is to control for firm size, firm performance and board size, as well as percentage 
of CEO ownership. Second, the independent variable (structural power) is entered into 
the equation. The third step is the inclusion of the moderator variable (board 
independence). Fourth, the interaction term (structural power * board independence) is 
included as part of the equation. At each step, the regression coefficients are examined to 
determine significance (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). To determine the statistical significance 
of the moderating effect, the squared multiple· correlation c0efficient (R2) from both 
equations (i.e., equations from step one to step two, from step two to step three and from 
step three to step four) is an F statistic. 
To test hypothesis 11 b, I examine the interaction effects of board independence 
and structural power on R&D investments ( one form of strategic choice). The first step 
. in multiple regression analysis is to control for firm size, firm performance and board 
size. Second, an ind~pendent variable (structural power) is entered into the equation. 
Third, a moderator variable (board independence) is also factored in. Fourth, the 
' ; -. ' ' 
interaction term (structural power * board independence) is included as part of the 
. . . 
equation. At each step, the regression coefficients are examined to determine 
significance (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). To determine the statistical significance of the 
moderating effect, the squared multiple correlation coefficient (R2) from both equations 
(i.e., equations from step one to step two, from step two to step three and from step three 
to step four) is an F statistic. 
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Mediated Regression 
This design includes a mediated regression analysis. A mediated relationship 
occurs when an independent variable is expected .to affect the dependent variable only 
indirectly through the mediated variable (James & Brett, 1984). ·· .Further, a mediated 
relationship is best performed when there is a case for a strong relationship between the 
independent and dependent variable (Baron & Kenny, .1986). There· is empirical support 
that informal powers have significant and positive relationships with strategic choice 
(Finkelstein, 1992; Michel & Hambrick, 1992). 
Three ·conditions must exist to establish mediation: the variation in the 
independent variable causes significant variation in the predicated variable (a); the 
variation in the mediator causes ·significant variation in the dependent variabl~ (b); and 
when the paths of a and b are controlled for, a is no longer significant. 
The equations for mediation are as follows: 
Equation 1 = regressing Y on X: Y = Po+ P1 X + E; 
Equation 2 = regressing Z on X: Z ==ho+ b1 X + E; 
Equation 3 = regressing Y on both X and Z: Y = Po + P1 X + P2 + E. 
Full mediation occurs when P2 :in equation three is significant and P1 is not 
significant, yet in equation one P1 is significant.· When both P2 and P1 are significant in 
equation three, but P1 in equation three is lower than P1 in equation one, this is a case of 
partial mediation. · In addition, b1 in equation two should be significant. Finally, there 
also has to be a significant change in r-squared and F when compared to equations one 
and three. 
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Data Analysis 
Data includes 300 companies that were randomly collected from a sample of the 
Fortune 1,000. However, 30 companies were eliminated from the study since the level of 
education and the school where education of the CEO was attained was not available for 
those firms. As well, I eliminated 2 companies since the level of education for the CEO 
was O and elite education was 1 (no college degree); therefore, the sample is 268 firms. 
My analyses includes three major analyses, one that looks at the front half of the model 
and then independently examining the second half of the model, which examines the 
effects of structural power on diversification and R & D investments. Finally, I examine 
the full model, using mediation analysis. 
Initial analysis of the data included scatt.er plots and normal P-P plots as well as, 
plus I examined the skewness and · kurtosis measures, which are important tools to 
determine the normality of the ,data and thus an important step when the goal is for 
inference (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The analysis of the scatter plot provided very 
little insight as to linear relationships based on the limited levels of the dependent 
variable and the fact .that in most independent variables had a range that included all 
levels of structural power (t];ie dependent variable). The normal P-P plot shows the 
necessary snake-like for all independent continuous variables but. one, which was 
percentage of ownership. The following normal P-P plot shows the skewness of the 
percentage of ownership data. See Table 1. 
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Table 1: Normal P-P Plot= Percentage of Ownership 
An examination of the descriptive statistics such· as skewness, which shows a statistic of 
55.382 and a standard error of .297 and kurtosis, which shows a statistic of 6.6.94 and a 
standard error of .149, suggests that there may be concern with this variable. · A log-
transformation, which can be used to remedy failures ofnoll'-normality, although such as 
technique is not universally accepted (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). A natural log 
transformation provides the following results on the normal P-P plot. See Table 2. 
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Normal P-P Plot of OWNPTRSF 
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Table 2: Normal P-P Plot - Percentage of Ownership Log Transformation 
As should be apparent, this transformation does appear to improve the data, although it 
still does not appear to follow the ideal snake-like pattern. In addition, the statistics for 
both skewness (2.557) l;llld kurtosis (6.612) support the conclusion that the transformation 
has improved the normality of the percentage of ownership variable. 
Results 
Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations are reported in Table 3. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. CEO tenure 6.23 7.11 1.00 .421 ** -.078 .043 .. .043 .495** -.642** .278** 
2. Organizational tenure 17.32 12.11 .421 ** 1.00 -.113 -.086 .026 .204** -.228** .131* 
3 .Education level 5.59 1.57 -.078 -.113 1.00 .358** .150* -.185* -.002 -.196** 
4. Elite education 2.59 .77 .043 -.086 .358** 1.00 .088 .056 -.069 -.080 
5. # directorships 1.48 1.29 . 043 .026 • .150*. .088 1.00 -.155* -.096 -.096 
6. Founder status 
.13 .34 .495** .204** -.185** -.056 -.155* 1.00 -.32~** .533** 
7.o/oindependentboard '·· 
.38 .28 -.642** -.228** -.002 -.069 -.096 -.325** 1.00 -.208** 
8. % ownership 1.71 5.99 .278** .131* -.196** -.080 -.096 .533** -.208** 1.00 
9. Prior year ROE 18.73 86.70 -.050 .010. .038 .079 .023 -.056 .060 -.0.38 
-...J 10. Logsales . 3.78 .56 -.083 .140* .105 .085 .087 -.065 .142*. -.065 ,· 
0\ 11. # board members 10.63 2.64 -.049 .143* .101 .ll2 .090 -.028 .074 -.082 
12. Structural power 3.04 .829 .227** .042 -.006 .136* .150* .181 ** -.198** .139* 
13. Related diversification 
.19 .30 -.127* -.079 .028 .085 .066 -.064 .139* -.062 
14. Unrelated diversification .28 .33 -.006 .130* -.042 .065 .121 * -.047 .092 -.081 
15. Total diversification .47 .43 -.091 .046 -.013 .107 .137* -.080 .165** --.105 
16. R&D/Sales .06 .08 .105 -.082 .064 .174* -.039 .092 -.029 -.042 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Cont'd 
Mean S.D. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. CEO tenure -.050 -.083 -.049 .227** -.127* -.006 -.091 .105 
2. Organizational tenure 
.010 .14* .143* .042 -.079 .130* .046 -.082 
3. Education level 
.038 .105 . .101 -.006 .028 -.042 -.013 .064 
4. Elite education 
.079 .085 .112 .136* .085 .065 .107 .174* 
5. # directorships 
.023 .087 .090 .150* .066 .121 * .137* -.039 
6. Founder status 
-.056 -.065 -.028 .181 ** . -.064 -.047 -.080 .092 
7. % independent board 
.060 .142* .074 -.198** .139* ;092 .165** -.029 
8. % ownership 
-.038 ·-.065 .082 .139* -.062 ~.081 -.105 -.042 
9. Prior y_ear ROE 1.00 .043 .125* -.021 .015 -;072. -.045 -.032 
10. Logsales .043 1.00 .355** -.042 .129* .172** .219** · -.245** 
-:i 11. # board members .125* .355** 1.00 -.186** .180** .008 .129* -.255** 
-:i 
12. Structural power -.021 -.042 -.186** 1.00 .069 .191** .193** -.006 
13. Related diversification 
.015 .129* .180* .069 · 1.00 · -.048 .644 -.130 
14.Unrelated diversification -.072 .172** .008 .191 ** -.048 1.00 .733** -.221 ** 
15. Total diversification -.045 .219** .. 129* .193** .644** .733** 1.00 -.257** 
16. R&D/Sales -.032 -.245** -.255** -.006 -.130 -.221 ** -.257** 1.00 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
The examination of the correlations provides some insight in the proposed' relationships. 
First, there does not . appear to be any multicollinearity, at least on the surface. 
Organiz;:1.tional and CEO tenure have a correlation of .421 (p < .01) and founder status 
and CEO tenure have a correlation of -.495 (p < .01), but these are the highest correlation 
among the informal and formal (percentage of ownership) power variables. Control 
. variable ROE has very little correlation with any variable in the design while log of sales 
and number of board members do appear to be relevant variables to be included in the 
design. In addition, I examined the variance inflation factors (VIF) in the main effects 
model and found that each variable was well below the · problematic level of 10. 
Structural power, the dependent variable for the front of the model, does have 
correlations that are statistically significant with many of the independent and moderator 
variables (i.e., CEO tenure .227, p< .01, elite education; .136, p < .05, founder status 
.181, p < .01; number of directorships held .15, p < .05; and percentage of independent 
board members -.198, p < .01). These findings provide initial support for hypotheses 1 
and 2, and lend credence to my assertion that some forms of power may beget other 
forms of power. The moderating variables also have correlations ·that are statistically 
significant with sonie informal power measures (i.e., percentage of independent board 
members with CEO tenure -.642, p < .001 and with organizational tenure -.228, p < 
.001). Finally, concerning variables from the front half of the model, CEO ownership 
appears to have significant correlations with many informal power variables as well as 
structural power (CEO tenure .278, p < .01; organizationaltenure .131, p < .05; founder 
status .533, p < .01; and structural power .139, p < .05). 
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An· examination of the second half of the model also shows some significant . 
correlations. Structural power is significantly correlated with both unrelated and total 
diversification (unrelated diversification .191, p < .01 and total diversification .193, p < 
. ' 
.01), whereas, R&D/sales has significant correlations with unrelated and total 
diversification (unrelated diversification -.221, p < .01 and total diversification -.257, p < 
.01). R&D/sales, however, has very little correlation with structural power. 
Analysis of Ordinal Regression 
The Log-likelihood (-2LL) test provides information concemmg the overall 
fitness of the model, with a well fitting model having a p-value < .05. The first model to 
examine is the control variable model. As shown on Table 4, this model does fit well 
(p < .01). In addition, the number of board members has a significant negative effect 
({3 = -.138, p < .01) on the structural power. 
Table 4 
Ordinal Regression Results for Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 & 9 
DV = Structural Power 
Predictors and Controls 1 2 3 4 5 
Prior year ROE .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Logsales .200 .134 .179 · .196 .196 
# of board members -.138** -.166** -.172 -.163** -.161** 
% of independent board -l.12** -.337 .009 .970 -.350 
% of ownership .035 .028 .027 .017 -.020 
CEO tenure .034 .083* .159*** .042 
Organizational tenure -.004 .000 -.005 -.005 
Educational level -.021 -.005 · -.019 -.013 
Elite education .372* .309t .357* .367* 
Founder status .349 .943t' .·· .. 609 .344 
# directorships .249** .260** .251 * .239 
CEO tenu:re*Elite ed. -.043· 
CEO tenure*# director -.012 
CEO tenure*Founder -.105t 
Org. tenure*Elite ed. .000 
Org. tenure*#director -.013 
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Org. tenure*Founder -.009 
Education*Elite ed. .079 
Education *#director .034 
Education *Founder .191 
%independent .430** 
directors*CEO tenure 
%independent -.031 · 
· directors*org tenure 
·. %independent 
-.451 
directors*.education level 
%independent -1.29* 
directors*elite education 
%independent .343 
directors*founder status 
%independent .687t 
directors *directorship 
· % ownership *CEO tenure .003 
% ownership *Org. tenure -.004 
% ownership* Education -.007 
% ownership* Elite ed. .005 
% ownership*. Founder .028 
status 
% ownership* -.034 
#directorships 
-2 Log Likelihood 607.95** 591.23*** 576.22*** 568.04*** 585.45*** 
. Model Chi-square . 21.246 37.96 .52.973 61.16 43.74 
Incremental chi-square 16.72* 15.01 t 2320*** 5.78 
Pseudo R-squared .084 .146 .198 .226 .167 
Df 5,263 11,257 20,248 17,251 .. 17,251 
t<.10, *p<. 05, **p<. 01, ***p<. 001 
Model 2 examines hypotheses 1 and 2. The overall -2LL test of model 2 is p < .001 
which means the overall model fits well. Moreover; the chi square difference test is 
significant at p < .05 (incremental x.2 = 16.72, pseudo .r-squared = .. 146). Both elite 
education ((3 ~ .372, p < .05) and numbet of directorships ((3 = .249, p < .01) have 
significant and positive relationships with structural power,. which supports hypotheses 2a 
and 2b. Hypothesis 2c and parts a, b, and c of hypothesis 1 are not supported. Thus, 
hypothesis 2 is well supported, which suggests that · prestige power in an. important 
indicator of structural power. Hypothesis 1 is not supported. 
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Model 3 examines hypotheses 3, 4 and 5. The overall -2LL test of model 3 is p < 
.001 which means the overall model fits well; however, the chi square difference test is 
only moderately significant at p < .10 (incremental x2 = 15.01, pseudo r-squared = .198) 
and the results do not support the hypotheses. The interaction of CEO tenure and founder 
status .have a marginally significant interaction ((3 = -.105, p < .10), which suggests that 
the interaction of expert power and prestige power is marginally significant in predicting 
structural power . 
. Hypotheses 6 and 7 are examined in model 4. The overall -2LL test of model 4 is 
p < .001 which means the overall model fits well; the chi square difference test is also 
significant at p < .001 (incremental x2 = 23.20, pseudo r-squared = .226). There are 
significant interactions between percentage of independent board members and elite 
education (/3 = -1.29, p < . 05) · and between percentage of independent board members and 
CEO tenure ((3 = .43, p < .01) and a moderately significant interaction percentage of 
independent board members and the number of directorships ((3 = .687, p < .10), which 
suggests that an independent board does interact with infonilal powers and thus has an 
indirect effect on structural power. Below are three interaction plots. I will start with the 
interaction of elite education and percentage of independent board members. See Table 
5. 
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. Table 5 
Interaction Plot- Elite Education and Percentage of Independent Board Members 
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As shown in Table 5 the blue line represents the moderator at high levels of moderation, 
. while the red line represents the moderator at low levels of moderation. At high levels of 
moderation there is a steeper line than at low levels of moderation. Thus, there is support 
that independent boards do influence. the effects that elite education can have on structural 
· power attained by the CEO: These effects are similar to the other significant moderation 
relationships. Table.6 represents the interaction of number of directorships and percentage 
of independent board members. 
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Table 6 
Interaction Plot - Number of Directorships and Percentage of Independent Board Members 
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In Table 6, the low level of moderation is basically flat, while the high level of moderation i's 
steep. Therefore, there is strong support that independent boards do influence the effects 
that the number of directorships have on structural power attained by the CEO. Finally, 
Table 7 shows the interaction ofCEO tenure and percentage of independent board members. 
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Table 7 
Interaction Plots - CEO Tenure and Percentage of Independent Board Members 
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CEO Tenure 
·· Based on Table 7, there is support that independentboards do influence the effects of CEO 
tenure on structural power attained by the CEO. The influence, however, is opposite 
(positive) to what was hypothesized. 
Hypotheses 8 and 9 are examined in inodel 5 .. The overall -2LL test of model 4 is p 
< .001 which means the overall model fits well. · However, the chi square difference test 
is non-significant (incremental x.2 = 5.78, pseudo r-squared = .167). In addition, there are 
no significant interactions with · percentage of · ownership and the six informal power 
· variables in this model; therefore, both hypotheses are not supported~ which suggests that 
ownership does · not have significant interactions with informal powers with respect to 
influencing structural power. I also examine the interactions with the transformed 
percentage of ownership and found similar results of non-significant interactions. 
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Multiple Regression Analysis 
Structural Power Effects on Strategic Choice (Diversification Strategies) 
To test hypotheses 10a and lla, I included controls variables, with structural 
power as the independent variable, and incorporated in separate models the different 
modes of diversification. I also included the interactional · term, percentage of 
independent board members * structural power. Table 8 provides the results. 
Table 8 
Multiple Regression Results for Hypotheses 1 Oa & 11 a 
DV = Related diversification DV = Unrelated diversification 
Predictors and Controls 1 2 3 4 5 6 
# of board members .017* .020** .021 ** -.011 -.005 -.005 
ROE .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Logsales .033 .031 .028 .091* .087* .087* 
% of ownership .000 -.001 -.001 -.004 -.005 -.005 
CEO tenure -.002 ~.002 -.002 .002 .000 .000 
Organization tenure -.002 -.002 -.002 .004* .004* .004* 
Education level -.007 -.007 -.009 -.022 -.020 -.020 
Elite education .028 .021 .024 .047t .035 .035 
# of directorships .014 .009 .010 .03lt .022 .022 
Founder status .007 -.002 -.007 -.012 -.029 -.028 
% of independent board .097 .104 .431 .. 163t .l 75t .137 
Structural power .046t .054* .080** .079** 
% of independent board * . -.106 .012 
Structural power 
F (full model) 1.677t 1.88* 1.868* 2.474** 3.191 *** 2.935** 
R2 
.067 .081 .087 .096 .131 .131 
Adj. R2 .027 .038 .041 .057 .090 .086 
Change in R 2 . .014 .006 .034 .000 
F (change) 3.899* 1.666 10.109** .018 
Df 11,257 12,256 13,255. 11,257 12,256 13,255 
t<. 1~ *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 8 ~ cont'd 
Multiple Regression Results for Hypotheses lOa & I la 
DV = Total diversification 
Predictors and Controls 7 8 9 
# of board members .006 .015 .015 
ROE .000 .000 .000 
Logsales .124* .117* .115* 
% of ownership -.005 · -.006 -.006 
CEO tenure. .000 -.002 -.002 
Organization tenure .002 .002 .002 
Education level -.029 -.027 . -.029 
Elite education .075* .056 .059 · 
# of directorships .045* .031 .032 
Founder status -.005 -.031 -0.35 
% of independent board .260* .278 .569 
Structural power .126*** .133*** 
% of independent board * -.094 
Structural power 
% of outside board * 
Structural power 
F (full model) 3.023** 4.187*** 3.911 *** 
R2 
.115 .165 .167 
Adi. R2 .077 .125 .124 
Change inR2 .050 .002 
F (change) 15.16*** .665 
Df 11,257 12,256 13,255 
t<. 10, *p<. 05, **p<. 01, ***p<. 001 
Baseq on the results, · hypothesis 1 Oa is supported, while hypothesis 11 a is not, 
which suggests that structural power does affect diversification, particularly unrelated 
and total diversification, while independent boards·do not interact with structural power 
to affect diversification. The models including the main effects for both unrelated and' 
total diversification are significant (p < .001, change in F score = l0.IQ9, p < .01 for 
unrelated diversification and change in F score =15.16, p < .001 for total diversification), 
and each have respectable adjusted r-squares (.09 and .125). Structural power has a 
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positive relationship on both unrelated diversification (/3 = .080, p < .01) and total 
diversification (/3 = .126, p < .001). Thus, hypothesis 10a was well supported. However, 
the model that included related diversification was only moderately significant (/3 = .046, 
p < .10). Further, the interactional term added little to the overall equation ( changes in F 
score were not · significant) for . all three models (related,_ unrelated and total 
diversification), and the interactional . terms were all __ non-significant. Thus, hypothesis 
11 a is not supported. 
Struct~ral Power and R&D Invest~ents 
To test hypotheses lOb and 11 b, all control variables w'ere included in the first 
equation; the second equation also includes structural power; and the last equation adds 
the interactional term. See Table 9_ for the results. In model 2, the regression equation is 
significant {p < .05) and there is a moderately significant (and negative) relationship 
between structural power and R & D investments ((3 = -.015, p < .10). In addition, the 
change of F is moderately significant (2. 796, p < .10). Therefore, hypothesis 1 Ob is 
moderately supported? which suggests that structura( power marginal~y affects R&D 
investments. However, the change of F is non-significant (F score = 1.417) and the 
interactional term in model 3 is non-significant and thus does not support hypothesis 11 b, 
which suggests that independent boards do not interact with structural power to influence 
R&D investments. 
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· · Table 9 
Multiple Regression Results for Hypotheses 1 Ob & 11 b 
DV = R &_D / Sales 
Predictors and Controls 1 2 3 
# of board members -.006* -.007* -.008** 
ROE .000 .000 .000 
.Logsales -.030* -.030* -.029 
% of ownership ·. -.004 -.004 -:oo4t 
CEO tenure .001 .001 .001 
Organization tenure .000 .000 .000 
Education level .000 .001 .001 
. Elite education .019* .022* .021* 
# of directorships -.002 -.001 ·. . -.002 
Founder status ' .032 .033 .035 
% of independent board .039 .035 -.076 
Structural power . -:015t -,018t 
% of independent board * .036 
Structural power 
F (full model) · 2.264* 2.336* 2.273* 
R.l 
.16 .177 .186 
Adj.R.t .089 .101 .104 
Change inR.t .018 .009 
F (change) 2.796t 1.417 
Df 11,257 12,256 · 13,255 
t<. JO, *p<. 05, **p<. 01, ***p<. 001 
Mediation Regression 
To test hypotheses 12a-f and 13a-f, I examine mediationwith theinformal powers 
as the independent variable, structural power as.the mediator and strategic choice as the 
dependent variable. See Table · .. 10 for results. The first step of mediation (model 1) 
examines the relationshipbetween the independent variables (expert/prestige power) and 
the dependent variable (strategic choice). The second step (model 2) examines the 
relationship between the independent variables and the mediator (structural power) . 
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Finally, the third step (model 3) includes independent variables, the mediator variable and 
the dependent variable. 
Table 10 
Multiple and Ordinal Regression Results for Hypotheses 12 & 13 
DV = Related diversification for· DV = Unrelated diversification 
Models 1 & 3 Models 1 & 3 
DV = Structural power for . DV = Structural power for 
Model2 Model2 
Predictors and Controls 1 2 3 1 2 3 
# of board members .017*. -.1.66** .020** -.011 -.166** -.005 
ROE .. . 000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 
Logsales .033· .134 · .031 .091* .134 .087* 
% of ownership .000 .028 -.001 -.004 .028 -.005 
CEO tenure -.002 .034 -.002 .002 .034 .000 
Organization tenure -.002 -.004 -.002 .004* · -.004 ·. · .004* 
Education level -.007 -.021 -.007 -.022 -.021 -.020 
Elite education .028 .372* .021 .047t .372* .035 
# of directorships .014 :249** .009 .031t '.249** .022 . 
Founder status .007. .349. -.002 -.012 .349 -.028 
% of independent board .097 -.337 .104 .163t . -.337 .175t 
Structural power .046t ' .080** 
F (full model) . l.677t 1.880* 2.474** 3.191*** 
-2 Log Likelihood 591.23*** 591.23*** 
Pseudo R2 .146 .146 
R2 ;067 .081 .096 .131 
Adj.R.l .027 .038 .057 .090 
Change in R2 .014 .034 
F (Change) 3;899* · 10.109** 
Df 11,257 11,257 12,256 11,257 11,257 12,256 
t<. 10, *p<. 05, **p<. 01, ***p<. 001 
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Table 10,.... cont'd 
Multiple and Ordinal Regression Results for Hypotheses 12 & 13 
DV = Related diversification for . DV = Unrelated diversificatio~ 
Modelsl & 3 . · Models 1 & 3 
DV = Structural power for DV = Structural power for 
Model2 Model2 
Predictors and Controls· 1 2 3 1 2 3 
# of board members .006 -.166** .015 -.006* -.166~* · -.007* 
ROE .000 .000 .000 · .000 .000 .000 
Logsales .124* .134 .119* -.030* .134 -.028* 
% of ownership -.005 .028 -.006 · -.004 .028 . -.005 
CEO tenure .000 .034 -.002 .001 .034 .001 
Organization tenure .002 -.004 .002 .000 -.004 .000 
Education level -.029 -.021 .. -.027. .000 -.021 .001 
Elite education .075* .372* .056 .045* .372* .022* 
# of directorships .045* .249** .031 -.002 .249** -.001 
Founder status -.005' .349 -.031 .032 .349 .033 
% of independent board · .260* -.337. .278* .039 -.337 .038 
Structural power .126*** -'.015t 
F (full model) 3.023** 4.187*** 2.264* 2.284* 
-2 Log Likelihood 591.23*** 591.23*** 
Pseudo R2 .146 .146 
R2 
.115 .165 .160 .177 
Adj. R2 .077 .125 .089 .101 
Change inR2 .050 .018 
F (Change) 15.163*** 2.796t 
Df 1 l, 257 11,257 12,256 11,257 11,257 12,256 
t<. 10, *p<. 05, **p<. 01, ***p<. 001 
My examination starts with related diversification as the dependent variable. In 
the first model, there are no significant relationships with any of the informal power 
variables; thus there is no mediation when related diversification is the dependent 
variable. Next,I examine the proposed mediation model with unrelated diversification as 
the dependent variable. This model provides more promising results. ·In model 1, 
organizational tenure has a significant and positive relationship ((3 = .004, p < .05) with 
unrelated diversification, while elite education ((3 = .04 7, p < .10) and number of 
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directorships ((3 = .031, p < .10) have a moderately significant and positive relationship 
with unrelated diversification. I relaxed the p-values for this analysis and feel 
comfortable in my decision. In perusing top academic journals, I was able to find 
numerous articles that designated a p-value of< .10 as significant (usually qualified as 
moderately significant), and with this designation, the authors were able to conclude that 
there was a relationship. Some were main effects (see Reuer, 2001 from SMJ; Egri, & 
Herman, 2000 from AMJ; Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen, 2001 from AMJ; 
Geletkanycz, Boyd, & Finkelstein, 2001 from SMJ; and Autio, Sapienza, & Almeida, 
2000 from AMJ) and some were moderated effects (see Simons, Felled, & Smith, 1999 
from AMJ; Lovelace, Shapiro, & Weingart, 2001 from AMJ). Although my justification 
is not based on the fact that others were allowed to report significant findings based on p-
value of< .10, I feel that there are valid reasons for relaxing p-values. This rationale is 
based on two fronts. First, recent research has suggested that it is more difficult to find 
effects in studies that do no incorporate experimental designs (McClelland & Judd, 
1993). A reoccurring theme in the difficulty of finding statistical significance is that non-
experimental studies have more noise, and are thus less sensitive than experiments . 
. Power appears to be much lower in non-experimental studies. Therefore, power is an 
important matter when dealing with direct effectand moderated models. Second, I feel 
that I have provided a strong base for both hypotheses through solid literature reviews 
and sound arguments for the support of this moderated model. Therefore, I feel my 
findings do contribute important knowledge to management research. However, although 
I believe that relaxing the p-value in this model is justifiable, caution should be taken in 
utilizing such an approach. 
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In model 2, both elite education (/3 = .372, p < .05) and number of directorships 
(/3 = .249, p < .01) have significant and positive relationships with structural power. 
Organizational tenure, however, has a non-significant relationship. Finally, the third 
model, which includes both informal power variables and structural power, shows that 
. while elite education and number of directorships have non-significant relationships with 
unrelated diversification, while structural power has a significant and positive 
relationship (/3 = .080, p < .01) with unrelated diversification .. In addition, r-squared is 
.090 and the F change, from model 1 to model 3, is significant (p < .01). Thus, 
hypotheses 12d and 12e are supported, which suggests that structural power does mediate 
the effects of elite education and number of directorships on unrelated diversification. 
My analysis next includes total diversification as · the dependent variable. In 
model 1, both elite education (/3 = .075, p < .05) and number of directorships (/3 = .045, p 
< .05) have significant and positive relationships with total diversification. As well, in 
model two, both elite education (/3 = .372, p < .05) and number of directorships (/3 = .249, 
p < .01) have significant and positive relationships with structural power. Finally, model 
three, which includes both informal power variables and structural· power, shows that 
elite education and number of directorships have,non-significant relationships with total 
diversification,. while structural power has a significant and positive relationship 
(/3 = .126, p < .001) with total diversification. In addition, the adjusted r-squared is .125 
and the F change, from model 1 to model 3, is significant (p < .001). Thus, hypotheses 
12d and 12e are supported, which suggests that structural power mediates the .effects that 
elite education and number of directorships have on total diversification. A relationship 
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that I did not propose, but found, was a positive and significant relationship between . 
independent boards arid diversification ({3 = .278, p < .05). 
My final analysis of mediation models includes R&D investments as t.µe 
dependent variable. In model one, elite education ({3 = .045, p < .05) has a significant and 
positive relationship with R&D investments. As well, in the model two, elite education 
({3 = .372, p < .05) has a significant and positive relationship with structural power. In 
model three, elite education ({3 = .022, p < .05) is still significant; thus partial mediation is 
· present in this model. Therefore, hypothesis 13 is partially supported. 
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CHAPTER4 
DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
. Discussion 
Many strategic management studies propose that the CEO is the most powerful 
and influential figure in the firm (Barkema & Pennings, 1998; Bigley & Wiersema, 2002) 
yet in recent studies there has been less focus on the CEO and more attention on TMT 
(Daily & Johnson, 1997). Moreover, few strategic management studies that incorporate 
CEO power variables utilize multiple indicators of power and always assume that all 
forms of power occur at the same level. I incorporate a more fine-grained examination of 
executive power. and its interrelationships on CEO power and its influences on strategic 
choice. I proposed and found evidence that the CEO may obtain informal power in order 
to gamer more formal power. In addition, I proposed and found support that structural 
power is an important determinant of strategic choice. Finally, I found that some forms 
ofinform<;1l power indirectly, through structural power, affect a firm's strategic choice. 
Informal Powers Beget Formal Powers 
There does not exist, in strategic·. management literature, a CEO power based 
study that examines the interrelationship of the multiple forms of power, both formal and 
informal. This dissertation provides insightful results concerning the effects informal 
power can have on some forms of formal power, the impact governance mechanisms can 
have on the CEO gaining formal power, and on the CEO influences once these formal 
powers are obtained. 
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I argue. that'those who. increase informal powers will desire and eventually attain 
more formal power. There is strong support that CEO's who have greater informal 
- powers do achieve increases in structural·power. First, the number of directorships, or 
the numbe_r of boards a CEO was a member of, was a strong and consistent indictor of 
informal prestige power that was positively related to structural power. Service on 
outside boards provides the executive not only with important experiences that may not 
be available within the firm, but· also with influential networks of prestigious contacts. 
This prestigious network then will likely provide the executive with exposure as an 
important figure. within and outside the firm. This type of services also showcases the 
CEO as a legitimate- business figure who can provide important advice to other firms 
outside its industry (Daily & Johnson, 1997). Thus, increasing the number of 
directorships will add significantly to an executive's legitimacy, exposure, and 
prestigious contacts, thus increasing the CEO's informal power; this type of informal 
power will provide greater opportunities for CEOs to obtain more formal power than 
their less "connected" counterparts. 
Another strong indicator .of informal power that was associated with increases in 
structural power was elite education. Elite education, a form of prestige power, provides 
assurances to the firm that the executive, who was educated at a prestigious institution, is 
a legitimate business figure. Additionally, this ex·ecutive gains contacts with prestigious 
academics and practitioners associated with top tiered programs. Increased exposure as a 
legitimate and well-known business figure is gained from this type of informal power. 
Therefore, a CEO with an elite education can leverage this form of informal power to 
attain greater structural power. 
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Founder status, however, was not found to be an important determinant of 
structural power. Although the very nature of the position as the founder provides 
influence and legitimacy from within the firm, the founder's influence in a large, publicly 
traded firm may dissipate due to both the size and age of the firm . (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996; Nelson, 2003). Despite these results showing founder status as a non-
influential predictor of structural power, there is strong evidence that other forms of 
prestige power greatly affect how much formal structural power a CEO will attain. Two 
of the three indicators of prestige had explanatory power. Understanding the role prestige 
power has on attaining formal power is important in strategic. management. As the top 
manager of the firm gains greater formal power, such as becoming the chairperson and 
president, the CEO can become more aggressive in the agenda that he/she thinks is best 
for the firm, or, from an agency perspective, become more entrenched in a self-interest 
agenda (Pfeffer, 1981). By leveraging the informal power of prestige, the CEO has 
decreased the power struggles that may occur if this position was independent of the 
. chairperson and the president positions. 
Surprisingly, there is no evidence that expert power influences structural power. 
All three indicators of expert . power were very poor predictors of structural power. 
Education level, which was simply the number of years an executive studied in school, 
may have provided better results if the type of education was differentiated, such as a 
master in business versus a master in sociology. Education more relevant to the type of 
firm (i.e., engineering, computer) may play an important role in determining the 
expertness a CEO has within that firm. 
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Organizational tenure also provided poor showings concerning structural power. 
Although changing how educational level was measured may provide stronger results, 
measuring organizational tenure is a fairly simple procedure that provides no options for 
different measures. Obviously, organizational tenure, in itself, does· not influence the 
· CEO in gaining more structural power. Organizational tenure may show the level of 
loyalty and a certain level of competency but may not provide an acceptable basis for 
expertness at the level of the CEO. In other words, organizational tenure may not be a 
form of informal power that is considered when a CEO attains additional structural 
power. 
Finally, there was no support that CEO tenure was an important main effect variable 
that increased structural power. This result is rather surprising since CEO tenure has been 
influential in many studies examining CEO topics such as CEO compensation (Sanders, 
Davis-Blake, & Fredrickson, 1995), R&D expenditures (Ryan & Wiggins, 2002) and 
CEO succession (Cannella & Shen, 2001). However, similar to the measurement of 
organizati~mal tenure, greater levels of CEO tenure shows a level of loyalty and likely show 
some level competence, but does not seem to influence a CEO's formal power base. 
Although past literature shows that tenure with an organization, in the capacity of an 
employee, may assist promotions in lower levels (Tharenou, 2001), a CEO may require 
certain circumstances or situations in order to attain more structural power. In fact, CEO 
tenure does interact with governance conditions to create a strong and positive effect that 
influences structural power. 
Finally, concerning main effects, one interesting finding is that the number of 
board members has a strong and negative relationship with structural power. This 
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suggests that with a larger board, the CEO has less influence. Most studies that have 
examined board of director data have incorporated -measurement of board 
power/independence as percentage of outside board or percentage of independent board 
members (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson,. 1998) and more recently board tenure 
(Combs & Skill, 2003). Research on the effects of the number of board members on 
strategic management topics such as strategic choice, however, is scarce. Yet, in team 
performance literature, the size of an ideal team that instills a sense of responsibility and 
accountability (Tschan & Cranach, 1996) is roughly the same size as an average board. 
Extending this logic of an "ideal team" to a board scenario, accountability would be less 
with fewer board members because one individual could have more opportunity to pursue 
a personal agenda; Thus, in larger boards- the C~O's influence would arguably be more 
diluted than ifthere were fewer members of the board. 
Moderation Effects 
A real disappointment of my dissertation is. that there were no interactions 
between prestige and expert powers. In contrast, this study does prov~de support that 
whether a CEO is new to the position or is seasoned, a CEO has significant opportunities 
- to attain more structural power if he/she has some forms of prestige power. 
Ownership power was. treated as a. moderator -variable, since a main focus of this 
study was to isolate the effects of informal powers on structural-power. However, similar to 
Daily and Johnson's (1997) longitudinal study that showed percentage of ownership was a 
non-significant variable of firm performance, in our study ownership power had no 
significant effects either as a control variable or as a moderator on its inflmmce on attaining 
structural power. One reason that may counter the importance of ownership power is that 
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CEOs with significant voting power, which accounts for only a few of the CEOs in this 
sample, may not desire to attain that greater level of structural power, since the they already 
have a source of very influential formal power, voting power. The majority of CEOs, 
however, own very few shares in relation to the size of the firm (i.e., the average percentage 
is 1. 7% ), and thus ownership does not seem to be powerful enough to be used as leverage in 
obtaining more formal (structural) power. 
Finally, there is some support that governance mechanisms moderate the effect of 
high CEO informal powers on the CEO's attainment of increased structural power. 
Independent boards are important factors that can minimize agency costs to a firm 
(Pearce & Zahra, 1992). In this study, however, there is support that firms with a greater 
percentage of independent board members will allow CEOs with longer tenure, elite 
education and CEOs that sit on multiple boards more leniency in attaining structural 
power. Although these results do not support agency theory, such as the importance of 
limiting structural power of a CEO with high informal power, it does support the fact that 
. as the CEO gains more experience by way of tenure, exposure by way of multiple 
directorships, and recognition by way of elite education, these independent board 
members may feel more comfortable in allowing a loyal and well-respected executive to 
obtain more structural power. In fact, contrary to the preceding agency arguments, 
Finkelstein and D 'Aveni (1994) state that there are various perspectives of organizational 
theory that would support top executives' consolidation of power. For example, strategy 
formation perspective views powerful leaders as vital in order to ensure that strategy 
formation and implementation are performed in an effective way (Baliga, Moyer, & Rao, 
1996). This perspective is particularly important when the fim1 is in a dynamic 
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environment: having an unambiguous leadership is essential. in the new frontier of a 
rapidly changing landscape. Finally, Finkelstein and D'Aveni (1994) suggest that having 
a powerful leader is a strong sign to legitimize the position and thus provide confidence 
to all stakeholders that there is. "a clear sense of direction". 
Structural Power Effects on Strategic Choice 
Baliga, Moyer, and Rao (1996) state that most CEO duality support comes from 
anecdotal data, and that the limited CEO duality empirical studies are too simplistic and 
thus lack · important factors such as governance conditions. There is recent support, 
however, that CEO duality provides the chief executive with power over strategic 
decisions (Sridharan & St. John, 1998). · I explore this relationship further by examining 
whether with the addition of structural power, such as going from CEO and chairperson 
to CEO, chairperson, and president, there is a greater influence on strategic choice. I 
found evidence of this, particularly concerning choices in diversification strategy. 
Based on agency theory, CEOs with increased structural power are more likely to 
steer firms into complex strategies, such as unrelated diversification, for reasons such as 
increased CEO compensation, decreased employment risk, or decreases in the 
transparency .of an organization in . order to further pursue the CEO' s personal agenda 
. (Zajac & Westphal, 1996). Data presented provides some interesting results, namely, that 
the CEO will pursue more complex diversification . strategies, such as unrelated 
diversification rather than related diversification. Yet, there is empirical support that· 
certain types of diversification (unrelated) are not as beneficial; and even detrimental, to a 
firm's performance. 
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There are two tYPes of diversification, namely related and, unrelated strategies 
(Palepu, 1985). Related diversification strategies have become popular because of the 
synergies that are created when products/divisions complement each other. Unrelated 
diversification strategies focus not on synergies (Palepu, 1985) but more on exploiting 
untapped markets, rescuing an aligning -firm or spreading the business-specific risk across 
industries·(Eisenmann, 2002). 
Palich, Cardinal and Miller (2000) argue that as diversification strategies become 
more complicated; the financial benefits of diversification, such as offsetting losses with 
. gains from other business units, were diminished or even reversed. Hill and Snell (1988) 
found that unrelated diversification ·schemes were negatively.related to profitability. A 
,major study found that firms pursuing highly uni;-elated strategies from 1986 to 1991 had 
posted an average loss of 13% (Berger & Ofek, 1995). Conversely, Varadarajan and 
Ramanujam (1987) and Palepu (1985) examined both forms of diversification to find that 
related-diversified firms tended to outperform unrelated-diversified firms; . Finally, 
Palich, Cardinal, and Miller (2000) found that diversification initially proved financially 
beneficial for corporations, but as the diversification strategies became more elaborate the 
financial benefits diminished or even reversed (i.e., their model was an inverted U type). 
Thus, as diversification strategies become multifarious, they become less advantageous to 
the firm. 
As mentioned previously, there are various reasons· that a CEO would choose a 
more complicated, less transparent strategy, even. to the detriment of the firm. There is 
strong evidence that the CEO would more likely choose an unrelated diversification 
strategy over a related. diversification strategy. In addition, the greater the structural 
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· power, the. greater the overall (total) diversification strategy that is followed. by the firm, 
which is in keeping with the rationale based on agency theory. 
Besides. diversification as a strategic choice, the amount of R&D investments is 
also an important decision for a firm. · Unlike complex diversification strategies, research 
and development investments tend to be. more beneficial over time. Scholars have 
theorized that R&D investments play a critical role in determining a firm's productivity 
growth (Long & Ravenscraft, 1993), and innovation (Hill & Snell, 1989). Other studies 
support that R&D expenditures are beneficial to an organization's long-term financial 
performance (Hill, Hitt, & Hoskisson, 1988). Unfortunately, however, as the pressures 
from Corporate America focus . more .on short-term profits, firms are cost cutting 
programs such as research and development (Detz, 1996).- In fact, a study performed by · 
Long and Raven (1989) found that a· major reason for the decline of American 
corporations in relation to foreign companies was the differences in R&D expenditures. 
Thus, even though studies have shown that R&D investments are beneficial . to firm 
performance, agency theory proposes that CEOs with greater structural power will limit 
or minimize R&D in order to maintain· the short · 1un profits and decrease short term 
employment risk (Eisenmann, 2000). 
The results of this study are not as strong · for R&D investments as they are for 
unrelated and total diversification, but there is moderate '5upport that structural power is 
negatively related to R&D expenditures. Thus, CEOs with greater structural power are 
more.apt to .engage in strategies that decrease·.R&D investments than CEOs with lower 
structural power. 
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There is substantial support that CEO structural power is an important factor in 
determining some form of strategic choice. I argued that the CEO would desire increased 
· structural power in order to decrease the power struggles from other executives that 
would otherwise occupy the·· coveted top executive positions- such as president and 
chairperson. With this consolidation of power, the CEO would be more easily able to 
pursue agendas, such as an increase in total diversification and a decrease in· R&D 
investments, for the benefit of the executive's personal wealth but likely to the qetriment 
of the firm's long ~erm financial performance. 
Moderating Effects of Board Independence and Structural Power on Diversification 
and R&D Investments 
I did not find that an increase of independent board members provides important , 
governance conditions that· decrease agency costs. In all four models-. related 
diversification, unrelated diversification, total· diversification and R&D investments-
there were no significant inter.actions; thus, independent board members appear to be 
. neutral in support of the• strl;ltegies that the CEO has crafted and proposed to implement. 
In fact, from an empirical standpoint, when I included percentage of outside board 
members in tp.e equation, the interactions were still non-significant. These results show 
that there is still much work to be performed to determine the importance of these 
"independent" board members. Do they continue to "rubber stamp" strategies proposed 
by the firm's top executives or are there still impqrtant variables not incorporated in' 
board studies that may provide more insight? Perhaps variables such as board. tenure 
(Combs & Skill, 2003), ;with a combination of independent board status may provide a 
better basis for a board member to be more powerful and influential, and thus less likely 
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to ratify unhealthy strategic choices. · Possibly the answer lies in including other 
executive power indicators such as elite education or number of directorships that may 
also increase the board members' legitimacy or influence over strategic choices. There ,is 
an explicit assumption (and there is .some support) that independent/outside board 
members are an important component mechanism to · ensure that the actions of 
management are aligned with the interests of shareholders; thus the results from this 
dissertation do not necessarily mean ·that outside board .of directors are unnecessary or 
unimportant, just that there is need for change in the operationalizing of board 
independence and/or power. 
Mediation -The Full CEO Model 
Some promising results. from my dissertation are observed when the analysis 
includes the full model. The summru:y of the data provides support for ·a full mediation 
model. In· other words, some forms of informal power (prestige) indirectly affect, 
through structural power, strategic choice.· Tosi, Werner, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia (2000) 
suggest that in order for research designs. to have gr~ater explanatory power of strategic 
management topics, it is imperative to jncorporate not only applicable antecedents, but 
also relevant moderator and mediator variables. I have strived to incorporate a more 
complex design that has generated interesting results. 
Earlier studies proposed main effects of informal powers on strategic choice and 
firm performance (Daily & Johnson, 1997; Finkelstein, 1992; Hitt et al., 2001). I 
propose, however, that these studies view the relationship among the various power 
dimension as too simplistic · and that a CEO with increased informal power will attain 
greater structural power, in order to have greater formal influence on strategic choice. In 
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fact, my results show elite education and number of directorships indirectly influence 
strategic choice through the effects of structural power. 
Prior research designs that · have examined executive power have taken a 
simplistic approach, and as a result there have been admonitions for more complex 
designs (Finkelstein, 1992; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Daily and Johnson, 1997). I 
propose that designs that treat the dimensions of CEO power as same level variables and 
that examine the effects of each dimension on either strategic choice or firm performance 
would be in the category of a simplistic model. The mediation effects found in this study 
provide evidence of the .. importance of examining the interrelationships of these 
dimensions of executive power and their effects on strategic choice. 
Limitations, Future Research and Conclusion 
Limitations 
Although cross-sectional designs are common in CEO studies (Finkelstein & 
Boyd, 1998; Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989), a key limitation of this study is the fact that it 
is cmss-sectional. Thus, there may be some argument for reversal causality. For 
example, some could argue that having multiple titles (i.e., structural power) may 
influence the appointment to multiple board positions. Yet, I would argue that it is just as 
valid to propose the reverse scenario, based on both human capital and resource 
dependence theories. In addition, I randomly sampled a number of firms to determine the 
structure of board composition, and found that board members have an array of different 
backgrounds and positions such as consultants, professors, vice presidents, 
president/CEO, CEO/chairperson/president, and so forth, with the majority of board 
members not holding multiple titles (CEO/chair and president). Therefore, I argue that 
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firms will· want board members with varying. areas .of experience and expertise, or in 
other words variety of backgrounds. Zahra and Pearce (1989) provide an extensive 
model on the board of directors and its relationship to the organization. The model 
includes three specific responsibilities of the board: strategy, service, and control. A 
board consisting of a variety of backgrounds would likely contribute to the successful 
discharge of all· three responsibilities. Therefore, a deciding factor in choosing a board 
member would likely have more to do with variety than number of titles held. However, 
when a CEO is appointed to a board, he/she receives recognition from both the business 
community and within the firm of the CEO. Concerning elite education, there is a strong 
argument that there would be no reverse causality. In other words, it would be a fairly 
weak argument that structural power would cause an increase in elite education. 
Another limitation may be the . exclusion of individual and personality 
characteristics, such as transformational leadership qualities, that may also provide a 
basis for informal powers. CEO's with leadership styles such as a transformational or 
charismatic may leverage this influence to increase structural power. In addition, some 
CEOs may be more driven to amass structural power than others. Therefore, gathering 
primary data concerning the type of . leader · would be helpful, but, as argued by 
· Finkelstein (1992), this type of personal data from CEOs is much more difficult to gather 
because of the sensitive nature of such information. 
Generalizability. of findings is another limitation. . While this study included a 
· random sample of 300 corporations from the Fortune 1,000, it does not necessarily represent 
all of the U.S. or foreign firms. Public firms, and especially the 1,000 largest public firms, 
make up only a small fraction of all the firms in the U.S. Yet, this study focuses on CEO 
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power and strategic·choices such as diversification. Thus, gathering CEO power.data from. 
· smaller corporations would be important. However, an important outcome in this design is 
diversification and smaller, private firms may not have the resources to engage in a compl,ex 
· conglomerate.type strategy. 
A final limitation in this ·model (and study) is that· it ignores the potential 
processes that occur within the top management team. Trust is a process variable that 
may likely affect the CEO in attaining· more structural power. Trust, which is the 
''willingness of a party to· be vulnerable to. the actions of another party based on the 
expectation, that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, 
irrespective of the ability to monitor or control· that party'' would likely be an important 
relationship to have between the CEO and others in TMT in order to attain greater formal 
power. (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995, 712). 
Future Research 
A multiple stream of research from my dissertation would be to examine other 
effects besides strategic choice that structural powe~ can have on strategic management 
topics. One study that !plan to pursue is to determine if a CEO that has more structural 
power, is better able to take advantage of a more complex organization (such as 
diversification) and abuse potential information asymmetry by garnishing higher 
compensation despite weak financial performance. CEO compensation research is 
extensive, but many studies demonstrate that the link between firm performance and 
CEO compensation is weak (Barkema & Pennings, 1998); therefore, many researchers 
are offering other explanations for CEO compensation. Tournament theory and social 
comparison theory are · two theoretical frameworks that offer explanations for CEO 
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compensation. This model of CEO power could also contribute to an understanding of 
CEO compensation. 
Another future study would be similarto the first, in its examination of structural 
power in the context of a complex organization, but the dependent variable would be 
modifications to financial statements. The more powerful a CEO, the more often there 
would be in adjusted financial statements, and this relationship would be strengthen if the 
firm was more complex. Finally, an interesting study may be to examine a combination 
of all the CEO powers (formal and informal) to determine if a more powerful CEO would 
be more apt· to greater changes in strategic direction since the more powerful CEO is 
likely to have greater influence and thus greater control over the changes of the firm. 
Conclusion 
I incorporate two well-known theories to explain the interrelationships· of the 
dimensions of CEO power. More specifically, there is support that some forms of power 
(informal - prestige) may promote other forms of power (structural power). Two forms 
of prestige power, namely number of directorship and elite education, have significant 
and positive relationships with structural power. I also found support that board 
independence does moderate the impact of informal power on attaining more structural 
power. 
Besides the importance of informal power on structural power, I proposed and 
found support that structural power is related to strategic choice, having a positive 
. relationship with diversification and a negative relationship with R&D investments. A 
finding that makes this relationship more significant is that the full model has mediation 
effects. Informal power, specifically prestige power, is important and influences strategic 
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choice but only indirectly through structural power. A maJor propo'sition of this 
dissertation is that of all the dimensions of power, structural power is deemed most 
important; therefore;. those with higher levels of informal power will strive to attain 
greater structure power in order to have more influence overstrategic choices. There is 
support for this proposition. 
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